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Private treble damage actions now play a leading role in the en-
forcement of the federal antitrust laws.' Yet despite the widespread
recognition of their compensatory and deterrent role by courts2 and
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1. Private antitrust enforcement was much less significant than government enforce-
ment in the 50 years of federal antitrust litigation that preceded World War II. The
annual number of private antitrust suits grew markedly after the War, however, and is
now over 10 times that of government actions. [1975] ANN. REP. OF DIRECrOR oF ADrIN.
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 212; Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L.
& EcoN. 365, 370-74 (1970). This increase in the private component of antitrust litiga-
tion is due largely to a series of landmark post-War Supreme Court decisions in which
the Court liberalized traditional doctrines and statutory interpretations that would
otherwise have acted as "barriers to relief" in "suits serving important public purposes."
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) (antitrust
plaintiff may recover damages even if in pari delicto with defendant). See, e.g., Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 320-21 (1965)
(term "United States" includes Federal Trade Commission for purpose of Clayton Act
§ 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (Supp. V 1975)), which
tolls private action statute of limitations during pendency of proceedings instituted by
"United States"); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-
60 (1961) (no public injury requirement in suit under Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1958) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)); showing of private injury sufficient);
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946) (antitrust damages need
not be precisely ascertainable to be recoverable where defendant responsible for difficulty
in ascertainment). Another impetus for post-War private antitrust enforcement was the
1966 revision of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which for the first
time allowed binding adjudication of the damage claims of all members of a class of
similarly situated plaintiffs. See generally Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1966 Amendment
to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 7765 (1970). A final factor
has been the growing economic strength of the plaintiff's antitrust bar in the post-War
period, which has enabled plaintiffs to bring increasing numbers of damage actions
independent of government suits.
2. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690, 696 (1977);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968);
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975).
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commentators3 alike, the question of which parties have standing to
maintain these suits remains unresolved.4 Without adequate guidance
from the Supreme Court or from Congress, the lower federal courts
have adopted disparate approaches to this question, resulting in
sharply conflicting holdings and reasoning. Moreover, because each of
these approaches lacks sound analytical underpinning, even courts
employing the same approach often fail to dispose of cases in a con-
sistent, rational manner.
This article proposes a new analytical framework for achieving a
more systematic resolution of standing issues in private antitrust cases.
Part I introduces the standing problem besetting the courts in private
antitrust suits. Part II surveys and critiques the variety of doctrines
currently shaping judicial decisions on antitrust standing. In Part III
the policy considerations underlying the proposed approach are iden-
tified, and rules to apply and reconcile these considerations are ar-
ticulated. Finally, Part IV demonstrates how the proposed approach
would be applied in standing determinations in several classes of
antitrust cases.
I. The Contours of the Standing Problem
The statutory basis for private antitrust damage actions is § 4 of the
Clayton Act.5 That section confers the right to sue for treble damages
on "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... ." On its face,
this language seems to grant a private right of action to anyone who
can prove that an injury to his "business or property" was caused by
an antitrust violation.6 Yet the lower federal courts have created an
3. See, e.g., P. AREDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 68 (2d ed. 1974); Mf. HANDLER, H. BLAKE,
H. GOLDSCHMIDT & R. PITOFSKY, TRADE REmULATION 171 (1974); Areeda, Antitrust Viola-
tions Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1976); Loevinger, Private
Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958); MacIntyre, The
Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 113 (1962);
Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Elforcement,
40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Development in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952). But see Parker,
Treble Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 483 (1971).
4. The term "standing" denotes the status of being a proper party to maintain a
private antitrust action. See pp. 810-12 & note 8 infra. For the difference between antitrust
"standing" and "standing" for constitutional purposes, see note 11 infra.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The original version of § 4 was enacted as § 7 of the Sher-
man Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
6. See Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1958) (L.
Hand, J.) (suggesting literal interpretation of § 4); Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising
Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.) (language of § 4 quoted as if
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antitrust standing requirement by interpreting the phrase "by reason
of" to imply not only the fact of causation but also the presence of legal
causation. In § 4 case law this legal causation requirement, like the
proximate cause requirement in the law of torts, 7 restricts the scope
of a defendant's liability and a plaintiff's right to recovery. Although
antitrust standing is analytically distinct from the statutory require-
ments of "injury" to "business or property," s causation in fact, and
substantive protection, its precise definition remains elusive because
of the inherent ambiguity of the concept of legal causation.
The sparse legislative history of § 4 hardly suggests a congressional
unambiguous in giving right of action to "any person" injured by antitrust violation).
Cf. A. WALKER, HIstORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 295 (1910) (predecessor of § 4 "so plain
in all [its] parts, that [it] require[s] only to be attentively read by lawyers and judges to
be uniformly understood"). But cf. Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F. 821, 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1894) (quoted note 16 infra).
7. E.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955)
(describing "target area" test for standing as a test of "proximate causation"). See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236-37, 244-46 (4th ed. 1971).
8. Some courts have discerned a standing limitation not in the phrase "by reason of"
but in the terms "injury" or "business or property." This has clouded the definition of
antitrust standing still further. The Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977), epitomizes reliance on the statutory "in-
jury" requirement of § 4 to erect a standing barrier. There the Court, despite a dis-
claimer that it was not addressing the standing question, id. at 4613 n.7, in effect decided
that assumedly injured indirect purchasers in a chain of distribution do not have
standing because they cannot, as a matter of law, suffer "injury" within the meaning of
§4.
On occasion courts have put the phrase "business or property" to similar use. Tradi-
tionally the question of what constitutes injury to "business or property" has arisen
where the plaintiff had no existing business to be injured, but alleged that he would
have gone into business but for a defendant's antitrust violation. See, e.g., Martin v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966); Waldron
v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). A number of courts, however,
have denied standing in terms or in effect to economically injured plaintiffs on the
ground that the injuries they alleged were not injuries to "business or property." See
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972) (state cannot sue for injury to
its "general economy" because such injury not to its "business or property"); In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1045 (1973) (injury to governmental entities' noncommercial interests held not to be
injury to "business or property"); Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 845-46 (5th Cir.
1957) (corporate employees not injured in their "business or property" even though they
may suffer economic injury in fact); Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) f 61,250 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No.
77-1547 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1977) ("business or property" does not include consumer pocket-
book interests); Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(employment not "business or property"). But see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,360 (D. Minn. 1977) ('business or property"
includes consumer pocketbook interests). Because the definition of "property" is essentially
a prudential matter, a judicial decision as to whether an antitrust injury is an injury
to "property" may often mask a policy decision as to which kinds of interests deserve
protection from antitrust violations. See, e.g., Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1944) (interest in gambling equipment business held not an interest
in "property" under § 4, because common law does not condone gambling).
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mandate for the legal causation limitation that courts have imposed
on the seemingly all-inclusive language of § 4.9 As Part II of this
article explains, courts have created this limitation primarily out of
concern about the excessive penalties that may be incurred because of
the mandatory treble damages feature of the section. Despite the
potential conflict with the compensatory and deterrent purposes of
private antitrust litigation, many courts have denied standing on the
grounds that treble damage recoveries by every person affected by an
antitrust violation could exact duplicative or even ruinous recoveries
from antitrust defendants. Other courts have used the antitrust stand-
ing doctrine to bar claims that they consider "speculative." Some
courts, finally, have discerned a "windfall" element in treble damages
awards and have denied plaintiffs standing for that reason. Underlying
these standing decisions may be a concern of a completely different
kind: denial of standing may be perceived as a means of easing the
administrative burdens of antitrust actions.
The judicial concerns underlying the concept of antitrust standing
are not without validity; indeed, several have a major place in the
analytical framework this article proposes. The problem, rather, is
that few courts have endeavored to balance the strength of these
policies against the policies served by private antitrust actions.' 0 As a
result, the body of antitrust standing law now displays a decaying
9. Both the Senate and the House debates on the Sherman Act recognized the im-
portant role of private damage suits in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. As far as
can be discerned, however, Congress paid no attention to whether certain classes of
plaintiffs would be denied standing to sue under the "by reason of" language of § 7 of
the Sherman Act, the predecessor of § 4 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 4098
(1890) (Sen. Morgan). In fact, the legislators seemed to assume that anyone injured by
an antitrust violation would be able to sue. See, e.g., id. at 1767-68 (1890) (Sen. George)
(assuming that injured consumers could sue, but concluding that such suits would be
rare); id. at 2612 (Sens. Teller & Reagan).
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which provided for private actions under the Sherman Act
alone, was effectively superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provided for private
actions under all the antitrust laws. (Section 7, accordingly, was repealed as superfluous
in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.) The treble damages provision
contained in § 7 of the Sherman Act was not substantively changed by § 4 of the Clayton
Act. The thrust of congressional debate on the Clayton Act suggested strong support for
enhanced private enforcement of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., 51 CoNe. REc. 9090 (1914)
(Rep. Mitchell). The 1914 debates, like those of 1890, contain no intimations of a § 4
standing limitation. See, e.g., id. at 9185 (Rep. Helvering); id. at 12939 (Sen. Reed).
10. Regrettably, commentators on antitrust standing have failed to recognize that the
balance among various standing policies must be struck according to the facts of
particular cases. The commentators list the policies, but then proceed to analyze the
case law using formal rules. See, e.g., Lytle S. Purdue, Antitrust Target Area under Sec-
lion 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust
Violation, 25 Am. U.L. REv. 795, 796-803 (1976); Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of
Injury and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 9-10, 14-19 (1966); Sherman,
Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374, 405-07 (1976).
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formalism, characterized by contradictory, even arbitrary, applications
of rigid rules to cases distinguished on tenuous grounds. Policy con-
cerns often are adduced as makeweights; their real importance, both
to the case before the court and to the deterrent and compensatory
purposes of private antitrust litigation, is usually ignored.11
II. The Current Approaches to Antitrust Standing
Since the early days of private antitrust litigation, the basic instru-
ment of-or, as will become apparent, obstacle to-antitrust standing
analysis has been the "direct injury" rule. As its name implies, this rule
permits private actions to be maintained only by those plaintiffs whose
injury is considered to be a "direct" or "proximate" result of pro-
hibited anticompetitive activity. Those plaintiffs whose alleged injury
is held to be an "indirect," "remote," "consequential," "incidental,"
or "derivative" result of an antitrust violation are turned away at the
door.' 2 The law of antitrust standing has developed largely by elabora-
tion of the direct injury rule.
A. The Evolution of the Direct Injury Rule
The direct injury rule for antitrust standing is the illegitimate off-
spring of two early private antitrust cases, Ames v. American Tele-
11. Because the doctrine of antitrust standing reflects the special antitrust policy
considerations mentioned above, its focus is somewhat different from that of standing
doctrines familiar to constitutional lawyers. In constitutional litigation, the initial stand-
ing question is whether the claimant is alleging a "particular, concrete injury," United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974), that gives him a "personal stake in the
outcome" of the adjudication, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and thereby meets
the constitutional and prudential requirement of injury in fact. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-40 (1972); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99-103 (1968). Although such cases as Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973), lowered the standing barriers to those granted a statutory right of action and to
those bringing an action in which many others had a similar stake, the threshold test has
remained one of injury in fact. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). See gen-
erally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450, 450-56 (1970).
Antitrust plaintiffs pass this constitutional threshold by alleging the statutorily
required "injury in [their] business or property." Since such economic injury satisfies the
constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, the antitrust standing inquiry is
not concerned with whether the plaintiff has constitutional standing. See Malamud v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975).
12. The use of the terms "indirect," "remote," and "consequential" to indicate lack
of standing for want of a direct injury is illustrated in Loeb v. Eastern Kodak Co., 183
F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910), a case decided under § 7 of the Sherman Act. The use of the
terms "incidental" and "derivative" is illustrated in Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d
480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967). These terms are plainly synonymous for indirect injury. See, e.g.,
Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
923 (1971); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
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phone & Telegraph Co. 13 and Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.14 The rule
emerged from the special corporate law problems those cases presented.
Plaintiffs in the two cases were shareholders in companies that were
forced out of business by defendants' alleged antitrust violations.
Relying on the traditional doctrine that only a corporation, and not
its shareholders, may sue for injuries the corporation has suffered,";
the courts in both cases held that the stockholders lacked standing to
sue for the diminished value of their shares. 16 The application of the
doctrine here was indisputably correct. In an antitrust context, as
much as in any other corporate context, there is a need to prevent the
double recoveries and multiple lawsuits that can result when stock-
holders sue to vindicate what are in reality corporate claims.lT Yet
13. 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
14. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
15. See, e.g., Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 602 (1928); 13 AV. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 5910-5911 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
16. 183 F. at 709-10; 166 F. at 822-24. Before Ames, a number of stockholder antitrust
plaintiffs had been denied recovery not on multiple recovery grounds, since they had
sued derivatively, but on procedural grounds. The stockholders had brought their
derivative suits in equity, the courts found, whereas the Sherman Act conferred a right
to treble damages only in actions at law. See Metcalf v. American School-Furniture Co.,
108 F. 909 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1901), aff'd, 113 F. 1020 (2d Cir. 1902); Block v. Standard Dis-
tilling & Distrib. Co., 95 F. 978 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1899); Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F. 821
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894). Later decisions barring derivative damage suits at law were to
render these holdings an absolute bar to derivative antitrust suits. See note 17 infra
(citing cases).
Although based in principle on the traditional law-equity distinction, these opinions
evinced considerable hostility to private treble damage actions. In Pidcock, for example,
the court stated:
It is clear that the right to maintain . . . a suit [in equity] is not expressly con-
ferred by the act. . . . If it were the intention of the lawmakers to vest in every
irresponsible individual, who may deem himself aggrieved, the right to invoke the
drastic and far-reaching remedies conferred by the act, is it not reasonable to sup-
pose that they would have said so in unambiguous terms?
Id. at 822.
17. The barrier raised by the requirement that injured shareholders bring derivative
rather than direct actions for antitrust relief was soon made absolute by other restrictive
procedural rulings. In 1917, the Supreme Court held that derivative antitrust damage
actions could not be brought at law because derivative suits, being equitable in nature,
could be brought only in equity. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.,
244 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1917) (alternative holding). Yet the courts already had held that
derivative antitrust damage actions could not be brought in equity, since § 4 only au-
thorized damages at law. See Fleitman v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916);
Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 207 F. 459, 460-61 (D. Mass. 1913) (citing cases); note 16
supra (citing cases).
Thus, prior to the merger of law and equity in 1938, stockholders effectively were
denied any antitrust relief whatever when management, because of a conspiracy with
defendants or for some other reason, declined to bring a § 4 damage action on behalf of
the corporation. Derivative recovery has generally been permitted since 1938. See, e.g.,
Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); Rogers v.
American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962). See
generally Blake, The Shareholders' Role In Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
143, 145-48 (1961).
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despite the adequacy of traditional corporate law for dealing with the
problem of stockholder standing under § 4, the Loeb court added an
alternative ground of decision. The plaintiff could not recover dam-
ages, said the court, because his injury as a shareholder was "indirect,
remote, and consequential," the violation having been "directed at
the corporation, and not the individual stockholder."' 8 Ironically,
then, the direct injury rule for which Loeb is so often cited came into
being as a test for antitrust standing in a case where applicable
corporate law doctrine made the rule unnecessary. 19
The direct injury test that Loeb applied to corporate shareholders
was soon extended to corporate creditors20 and has been applied to
them with few exceptions ever since. Usually no reason other than
remoteness of injury has been advanced for denying creditors relief
when their corporate debtors were damaged by antitrust violations..21
18. 183 F. at 709. By adverting to an absence of "legal injury" in the stockholder, the
A mes court also recognized a legal cause requirement in § 4. 166 F. at 822. This re-
quirement, however, was rooted in corporate law doctrine and not in a separate concept
of directness of causation.
19. Shareholders suing in their own right have almost uniformly been denied stand-
ing under § 4 on the basis of the Loeb "direct injury" rule. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI,
Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 96-97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Kauffman v. Drey-
fus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (also
citing corporate law doctrine); Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp., 397 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.
1968); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1963);
Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Peter v. Western
Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1953); Walder v. Paramount Publix
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see Kolb v. Chrysler Corp., 357 F.
Supp. 504, 506-07 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (stockholder may sue for "direct" injury qua stock-
holder; court stressed that stockholder was also franchisee and manager of corporation).
The direct injury rule has been invoked even when the plaintiffs were the sole share-
holders in the corporation injured by the antitrust violation. See, e.g., Martens v. Barrett,
245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.,
193 F. Supp. 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc.,
147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956). A more appropriate ground for denying recovery in
some of these cases would have been the rationale that shareholder recovery might
prejudice creditors' rights.
General partners, like stockholders, have been denied standing under the direct injury
rule. E.g., Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952). Significantly, partners do not universally have legal capacity to sue derivatively
under § 4. Compare Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(partners may sue derivatively under federal law) with Hauer v. Bankers Trust N.Y.
Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cas. f 60,142 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (partners may not sue derivatively
under state law).
20. Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (employee-creditor
without standing because not injured in his "business or property"). Indeed, the plaintiff
in Loeb was a creditor as well as a shareholder, and the Loeb court assumed that the
direct injury rule denied him standing in either capacity. 183 F. at 709.
21. E.g., Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957); WValder v. Paramount Pub-
lix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoting Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aJJ'd snenz., 133 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1940) (dictum)). But see Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1969) (§ 4
suit by creditor and sole owner of corporation allowed without discussion of creditors'
standing); Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. ff 74,974, at
815
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At least one court, however, has noted that the important commercial
policy against preferences to particular creditors22 provides a sufficient
policy basis for denying private antitrust relief to creditors suing in
their own right under § 4.2 3
In the stockholder and creditor cases, the direct injury rule may be
said to have been superfluous, for corporate and commercial law
offered adequate grounds for barring recovery. The rule acquired a
claim to independent status as an antitrust standing criterion, however,
when it was first extended beyond the intracorporate context in the
1939 case of Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp.- 4 In
Westmoreland, a real estate lessor lost property in a mortgage fore-
closure caused by antitrust injuries to its lessee's business.2a The court
simply declared that, as a matter of law, the connection between the
alleged antitrust violations and the admitted injury to the lessor was
too "remote" for recovery.26
Despite the Westmoreland case, the direct injury rule did not yet
dominate the law of antitrust standing. During the 1940s corporation
employees regularly overcame "remoteness of injury" arguments and
recovered for loss of position and salary resulting from antitrust viola-
tions that had diminished their employers' sales. Roseland v. Phister
Manufacturing Co.,27 for example, held that a sales agent had standing
to sue for commissions lost after his employer and two competitors
conspired to fix prices and restrict sales in the plaintiff's sales territory.
To the defendants' argument that a sales agent, even if injured, "was
not within those to whom damages are granted, '128 the Roseland court
responded that the agent could sue because his claim fell within the
96,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1976) (employee
who had guaranteed employer's obligations had standing; injury "more direct" than
injury to non-creditor employee).
22. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970) (preferences generally voidable
by bankruptcy trustee); V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, COMMERCIAL LAW 195 (1971).
23. Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1957) (dictum)
("direct recovery by the individual creditor would give him a preference over other
creditors of the insolvent business and such recovery may act to thwart the policy of the
bankruptcy laws").
24. 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), afJ'd mein., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
25. Id. at 390-91.
26. Id. at 391 ("All elements considered, it seems to me that the claimed damages of
[the lessor] are more remote than those held to be unrecoverable [in the stockholder
cases].") See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574, 577 (2d
Cir. 1916) (dictum) ("One who had rented offices to corporations absorbed by an illegal
combination could not recover for losing them as tenants ... ") But see Camrel Co. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 1944-45 Trade Cas. ff 57,233 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (direct or
indirect character of lessor's injury treated as factual question).
27. 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
28. Id. at 419.
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plain meaning of § 4.2 9 Similarly, in Vines v. General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 30 Judge Learned Hand found a legally cognizable injury
to a sales agent who lost an account to his employer's co-conspirator in
a market division scheme. Rejecting an indirect injury contention,
Judge Hand held that the only relevant question under § 4, assuming
an antitrust violation had occurred, was the factual existence of injury
caused by that violation.31
The status of the direct injury rule as an independent test of stand-
ing, or legal causation, was further obscured during this early period
by the tendency of certain courts to confuse causation in fact with
causation in law.32 When some event intervened between the anti-
trust violator's actions and the plaintiff's injury, these courts, in deny-
ing relief, were often ambiguous as to whether the intermediate event
had in fact caused the injury, or had simply made the chain of causa-
tion stemming from the violation too "indirect." 33 In Westmoreland,
for example, the court not only held lessors too "remote" to recover; 34
it also suggested that because the mortgage foreclosure intervened
between the lessee's loss of income that had been used to make rental
payments and the lessor's loss of property, the lessor's injury could not
be said to have been caused by the antitrust violation, but only by the
foreclosure.35 It was unclear, therefore, whether the court was holding
that causation was too attenuated in a factual or a legal sense. 36
29. Id. The ruling in Roseland was followed by two courts which held that employees
were directly injured by antitrust injuries to their employers. Klein v. Sales-Builders,
Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. [ 62,600 (N.D. Ill. 1950); McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach.
Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 460 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (manager paid by commission may sue).
30. 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948).
31. Id. at 490.
32. See, e.g., La Chappelle v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass.
1950); Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.J. 1941). Cf.
W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 244 (problem of fact of causation "often hopelessly con-
fused" with problem of whether defendant "should be legally responsible for what he
has caused") (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F.2d 644, 645-46 (7th Cir. 1931); Westmoreland
Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), af 'd mein., 113
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
34. 30 F. Supp. at 391.
35. Id.
36. The reasoning of early standing cases like Westmoreland resembled that in early
treble damage cases, which manifested an unrealistically narrow conception of causation in
fact. See, e.g., Turner Glass Corp. v,. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 51-52 (7th Cir.
1949) (bankrupt plaintiff's injury not caused by admittedly illegal conspiracy); Hart v.
B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 12 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1926) (defendant's refusal to deal
with plaintiff held due to plaintiff's "objectionable" behavior, rather than to illegal
conspiracy); Jack v. Armour Co., 291 F. 741 (8th Cir. 1923); Noyes v. Parsons, 245 F. 689,
696-97 (9th Cir. 1917) (failure of business held due to mismanagement, not to illegal
merger, despite allegation that both merger and mismanagement were part of antitrust
violation; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261, 263-64 (Ist Cir. 1908)
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Thus, in the early 1950s, at the close of 60 years of private antitrust
litigation, the direct injury rule was a rule of uncertain authority. In
the stockholder and creditor cases brought under § 4, directness of
injury had been a secondary and even unnecessary ground for deci-
sion. Employees had sued successfully to recover for injuries they had
suffered as a result of harm to their corporate employers. And the
cases confounding legal causation and factual causation made it
doubtful that § 4 embodied any requirement other than causation in
fact.37 Yet notwithstanding the direct injury rule's unnecessary birth
and ambiguous status as precedent, the lower federal courts began in
the 1950s to treat directness of injury as the sine qua non of antitrust
standing.38 In 1955, for instance, the Second Circuit declared with
apparent certitude that "[t]hose harmed only incidentally by anti-trust
violations have no standing to sue for treble damages; only those at
whom the violation is directly aimed, or who have been directly
harmed may recover."'39 Although the courts subsequently have been
obliged to resolve standing issues in a variety of novel factual situa-
tions, the analysis of standing questions has, since the 1950s, con-
ajf'd on other grounds, 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (dictum); Ebeling v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 12
F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1935); Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distribs., 272 F. 323,
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Rice v. Standard Oil Co., 134 F. 464, 465 (D.N.J. 1905) (dictum).
These causation-in-fact cases were often decided, like standing cases, on the pleadings;
and later courts often cited them in finding a legal causation requirement under § 4.
See, e.g., Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
37. The pre-1950 cases interpreting the "by reason of" language of § 4 and not dis-
cussed above fall into two groups. In one group, courts held that a party injured as a
result of damage to another could only recover for its own damage and not, say, for
damages to the general public or to intermediate parties in a chain of causation. See
D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1915); Tivoli Realty
v. Paramount Pictures, 80 F. Supp. 800, 806 (D. Del. 1948); Westor Theatres, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures Corp., 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D.N.J. 1941); Folly Amusement Hold-
ing Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 32 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Carbonic Gas
Co. of America v. Pure Carbonic Co. of America, 4 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). In the
other group, courts held that associations could not sue for antitrust injuries sustained
by their members. See Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101
(8th Cir. 1942); Alabama Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Ala. 1939). Neither group of cases suggested any standing limitation
under § 4; each reflected only the requirement of proof of injury.
38. The principal decisions promulgating the direct injury rule as the essential test
of antitrust standing were Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294-95
(2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d
678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956), noted, 69 HARV. L. REV. 575
(1956); and Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). These courts relied on pre-1950 cases that had
used a directness of injury test. See, e.g., Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods.
Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (citing, inter alia,
Loeb and Westmoreland).
39. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
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sistently been carried out under the direct injury rule or some verbal
variant thereof.4 0
B. Judicial Application of the Direct Injury Rule
The direct injury rule, though easy to state, has in practice proven
difficult to apply. The courts have struggled in vain to find a con-
sistent method for deciding where in a chain of causation the line
between direct and indirect injury should be drawn. Some courts have
defined directness of injury as privity with an antitrust law violator.4'
But most courts have rejected this approach because it denies stand-
ing to competitors42 and to indirect purchasers in a chain of distribu-
tion or supply.4 3 Several other courts have sought to gauge directness
by looking to the intent of the antitrust law violator.4 4 The majority
of courts faced with the standing question, however, have eschewed a
priori definitions of directness. Instead, they have proceeded on the
assumption that determinations of directness of injury must be made
on a case-by-case basis and that "[n]o hard and fast rule" on direct-
ness of injury can be formulated.45 Accordingly, in 1973 the Ninth
40. For discussion of the one significant doctrinal departure from the direct injury
rule, see pp. 838-39 infra.
41. E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fy Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir.
1956); City of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259, 263 (E.D.S.C.
1965), rev'd, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
42. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
406 F. Supp. 224, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1116 (1977).
43. E.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582-83 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1949) (dictum); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation,
1973-2 Trade Cas. j 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 597-98 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge 9- Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169,
174 (V.D. Mo. 1965). It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court's decision that
indirect purchasers cannot sue under § 4, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W.
1611 (U.S. June 9, 1977), will give the privity doctrine a new lease on life outside
chain-of-distribution cases.
44. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955)
(plaintiff "was not only hit, but was aimed at"); International Rys. of Cent. America v.
United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), all'd on other grounds, 532
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976) ([qhe very concept [of 'target' of injury] implies intent"). But
see Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleumn Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D.
Md. 1974) (intent to injure particular plaintiff irrelevant in standing inquiry). As these
cases suggest, inquiry into intent has been particularly prominent in the so-called
"target area" cases, see pp. 830-32 infra-although intent is here part of a legal metaphor
rather than a necessary element of a § 4 claim. See note 98 infra.
45. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956). See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip.
Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir. 1976); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp.
312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
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Circuit, after an extensive review of the leading standing cases, con-
cluded with some understatement that "no 'bright line' has yet
emerged" to distinguish those with antitrust standing from those
without it.46
Although the courts generally have tried to conduct a case-by-case
inquiry into antitrust standing, the cases have tended to rely on one
or both of two broad approaches for ascertaining directness of causa-
tion. The first might be called the "categorization" approach, since
under it plaintiffs are held to be directly or indirectly injured accord-
ing to the descriptive category into which they fall. The second has
been called the "target area" approach, since under it plaintiffs are
held to be directly injured only if they are determined to be within
the "target area" of the alleged antitrust violation. While it might
appear that either approach would add refinement and certainty to
antitrust standing decisions, each doctrine has been inconsistently, if
not contradictorily, applied. Conflicts exist not only among courts
using different approaches but also among courts using the same
approach.
1. The "Categorization" Approach to Direct Injury
Under the "categorization" approach, the lower federal courts have
decided standing questions by drawing analogies to plaintiffs in the
early cases that held various categories of plaintiffs (e.g., competitors
and stockholders) either to have standing or to lack it. New cases are
either fitted into the old categories or placed into newly created ones.
Yet the standing of plaintiffs in these new categories is rarely de-
termined by reference to the policy goals of § 4. Often, the courts
inquire merely whether the new category "more nearly approaches" a
category whose status is perceived as settled by prior cases.
47
The categorization approach has been plagued by two defects: first,
inconsistencies in the characterization of similarly situated plaintiffs;
second, disagreements among and within circuits over whether sim-
ilarly characterized plaintiffs are directly injured. Two cases may be
46. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials &: Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501,
508 (3d Cir. 1976) (cases to date "create no binding test that is determinative of standing
in each particular case").
47. Nationwide Auto Appraiser Scrv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d
925, 929 (10th Cir. 1967). See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d
1269, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (plaintiff's category "at least
equally [as] remote as" previously established categories). For an early example of this
analogical approach, see Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-MaInville Corp., 30 F. Supp.
389, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), afJ'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
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taken to illustrate the first, or characterization, problem: Volasco
Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.48 and Sanitary Milk Pro-
ducers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc.49 Plaintiffs in both cases were sup-
pliers that were damaged by reduced sales to buyers operating in
markets that the defendants had attempted to monopolize. In Volasco,
the plaintiff supplied refined asphalt to a buyer in the roofing
materials industry. The plaintiff was denied standing because its
injury was "too far removed from the direct injury" to its buyer30 In
Bergjans Farm, the plaintiff was a milk processor that supplied a milk
distributor injured by a fellow distributor's predatory pricing. The
Bergjans Farm defendant happened to be an integrated concern in-
volved in both milk distribution and milk processing.51 Although this
fact was not a necessary element of the predatory pricing violation by
the defendant distributor,52 the court was able to seize on it to char-
acterize the plaintiff as a competitor of the defendant, rather than as
a supplier to the injured milk distributor. Accordingly, the court
granted the plaintiff standing in its capacity as competitor even
though it would have lacked standing in its capacity as supplier.53 But
since verbal gymnastics could not alter the fact that the plaintiff-
competitor was still a supplier, the Bergjans Farm court felt obliged
to distinguish the status of the Volasco plaintiff. It characterized the
Volasco plaintiff as a "raw material" supplier rather than as a "finished
product" supplier54-a distinction utterly lacking, of course, in anti-
trust significance.
Problems of characterization have reached their zenith in employee
standing cases. Standing determinations have often depended on
whether plaintiffs could be characterized as independent businessmen
or agents rather than as salaried employees of the defendants. 55 One
48. 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
49. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
50. 308 F.2d at 395.
51. See Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 478-81
(E.D. Mo. 1965), a! 'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
52. The plaintiff proved that predatory pricing in sales made to retail stores by the
defendant injured the plaintiff's distributor and thereby the plaintiff itself. Id. at 479-88.
This predatory pricing was indeed subsidized by the defendant's lowered profit margins
in milk processing, id. at 485, but the allegations of predatory pricing concerned the
distribution level, and the fact of vertical integration was irrelevant to the illegality of
that violation.
53. 368 F.2d at 688-89.
54. Id. at 688. The court also distinguished Volasco by noting that in Bergjans Farm
the plaintiff's processed milk was sold through a single distributor. Id.
55. Compare Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 935 (1976) (corporate officer qua employee has no standing) and Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 730 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) (salaried
employees lack standing; not "quasi-businessmen") with Bravman v. Bassett Furniture
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court has even held that although an employee lacked standing qua
employee, she could still recover "loss of salary and other employee
benefits" 6 because she could be characterized in a completely different
way. Finding that her loss of income impaired her potential success
as an entrepreneur in another enterprise, the court held that she could
recover her employee damages because she had standing in her " 'entre-
preneurial' " capacityY57
Conflicts among the circuits over directness of injury to similarly
characterized plaintiffs are particularly numerous and irreconcilable.
Illustrative of these conflicts are suits by employees, suits by lessors,
and suits by parties in the chain of distribution and supply. Several
circuits grant employees standing to sue for loss of income resulting
from antitrust violations that diminish competition in their employers'
industries. Other circuits, on similar facts, treat such employee in-
juries as too "remote" for recovery. An example of a case granting
standing to an employee is Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.,58 where
the Fifth Circuit held that a commissioned sales agent, fired after an
illegal monopolistic acquisition of his employer, had standing to prove
that his injury was caused by the acquisition, because his injury was
"direct" rather than "incidental."5 9 In contrast, in Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.,60 the Tenth Circuit ruled that employees were not
directly injured when they were fired as a result of an allegedly illegal
merger.61 Insofar as the plaintiffs in each case were sellers of labor to
industries, and allegedly lost their jobs as a result of an illegal lessen-
ing of competition, their injuries were no less "direct" in one case
Indus., Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,300, at 70,971 n.7 (3d Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. May 13, 1977) (No. 76-1597) (furniture
manufacturer's sales representative has standing; characterized in dictum as more like
agent than employee) and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 486-87 (5th
Cir. 1967) (commission sales employee has standing; court follows sales agent cases). But
see Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967) (even if work is
not "an independent business enterprise . . . the interest invaded by a wrongful act
resulting in loss of employment is so closely akin to the interest invaded by impairment
of one's business as to be indistinguishable"). In Reibert, Dailey, and Nichols the
characterization of the plaintiffs depended in part on whether their loss of employment
was considered an injury to "business or property." Reliance on this language from § 4,
however, was simply a standing determination under a different guise. See note 8 supra.
56. Bowen v. Vohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
57. Id. See Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no
standing "qua employee," but finding standing because the injury alleged was "the
termination of employment as a territory sales manager and the concomitant loss of
commissions and bonuses") (footnote omitted).
58. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
59. Id. at 487-88.
60. 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
61. The court held that plaintiffs' injuries were "too indirect to allow standing." Id.
at 732.
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than in the other. The Seventh Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit in
allowing employee antitrust lawsuits,0 2 while district courts in the
Second Circuit disagree on the antitrust standing of employees. 3 Thus,
employee standing to seek redress for antitrust injuries is often a
function of the fortuitous availability of different forums. 64
The categorization approach has produced similar inter-circuit con-
flict in suits by lessors. The question typically presented is whether a
lessor has standing to sue a third party whose anticompetitive conduct
has reduced the lessor's rentals by injuring his tenant. The Second
and Third Circuits have labeled such rental-diminution injuries to
lessors too "remote" for antitrust standing.a In Harrison v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,0 for example, a theater owner sued for a reduction in
62. See Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
63. Compare Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas.
74,974 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1976) (corporate
employee who was also guarantor of employer's obligations has standing) and Vandervelde
v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (president
of securities firm has standing to recover salary loss as employee after he was illegally
suspended by dealer association) with Hans Hansen Welding Co. v. American Ship Bldg.
Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 7i 74,739 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (executive officers of closely held corpora-
tion had no standing to recover lost salary and bonuses where it was "highly probable"
that they would be compensated if employer recovered treble damages) and Bywater v.
Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. f 73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rank and file
employees and labor union denied standing because their injuries were "incidental" and
"remote"). In Michelman, the court remarked upon a "recent trend . . . to accord to
corporate employees standing to sue for salary lost as the result of injury to their em-
ployers under the antitrust laws." 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,322. The trend is hard to
discern.
64. For other, seemingly irreconcilable, categorization decisions in cases brought by
employees following antitrust injury to their employers, see Martens v. Barrett, 245
F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957) (dictum) (no standing); Tugboat, Inc. v. Seafarers Int'l
Union, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,610 (S.D. Ala. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Tugboat, Inc. v.
Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976) (determination of no standing
reversed on appeal); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (dictum) (standing); Vermilion Foam Prods. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 386
F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (no standing); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 320 F.
Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970) (standing); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, 216 F. Supp. 330
(E.D. La.), a!f'd per curiain, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963) (no standing); Rossi v. McCloskey
& Co., 149 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (no standing); Miley v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 828 (1957) (no standing); and Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp.
912 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (no standing). Cf. Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D.
323, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (determination of employee's standing as "victim" of violation
must await development of facts at trial); Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp.,
43 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same).
65. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc.,
234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) (per curiam); Harrison v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 211
F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
66. 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
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rentals under a percentage lease, alleging a conspiracy among movie
distributors and, apparently, his tenant to deny first-run movies to the
theater he leased. The Third Circuit reasoned that, as a matter
of law, this injury was so "remote" and "uncertain" as to deny the
lessor standing to recover damages.67 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have reached the opposite result. In parallel circumstances of con-
spiracy among distributors and non-defendant lessees to allocate first-
run movies only to certain theaters, these courts have held that lessors
of the disfavored theaters are directly injured and hence entitled to
sue.68 In Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.,609 for example, the
Seventh Circuit flatly rejected the Harrison holding, treating direct-
ness of injury as a factual rather than a legal question7 0
67. Id. at 316-17. The Harrison opinion implies, but does not expressly state, that the
tenant was an alleged co-conspirator. See id. (any rights of landlord injured by con-
spiracy "directed against or participated in by the tenant" were "remote" and "un-
certain") (emphasis supplied). The court in Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246
F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957), drew the same inference. See id. at 589. It is ironic that the
Harrison rule barring suit by lessors as "remotely" injured parties apparently arose from
a case in which the lessor had actually been "directly" injured by his lessee's anticom-
petitive conduct. In Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 890 (1956) (per curiam), the plaintiff lessor's injury was likewise held to be in-
direct despite the alleged participation of his tenant, a defendant, in the alleged con-
spiracy. See id. at 519 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
68. Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957); Steiner v. 20th
Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956). See Sandige v. Rogers, 256 F.2d
269, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1958) (Hastings, J., concurring) (standing of non-operating lessors
acknowledged as law of Seventh Circuit).
69. 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
70. Id. at 593-95. In Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1956), the Ninth Circuit, holding on facts very similar to those in Harrison that a lessor
had standing to pursue an antitrust claim, seemed to blur the distinction between legal
and factual causation. See id. at 193 (distinguishing Harrison and similar cases on ground
that Steiner lessor's complaint alleged wrongful acts that "operated directly upon the
[plaintiff]").
The law of lessor's antitrust standing is further complicated by the Supreme Court's
reversal of a lower court decision that an injured lessor lacked standing to sue because
of his lessor status. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), the Court
avoided any reference to the categorization problem in noting that the plaintiff, who
leased property to his own closely held corporation, could sue for "competitive harm"
caused by the defendant's admittedly illegal price discrimination. Without endorsing use
of the direct injury rule, the Court simply indicated that the plaintiff's business interests
fell within the direct injury rule that had been used by the court below. Id. at 649-50
(dictum) (construing opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 815-16 (9th
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 642 (1969)). Yet in subsequent rulings the lower federal courts
have continued to deny standing to lessors on the ground that their injuries are
categorically "too remote." See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930
(1972).
For other cases dealing with lessors' standing to sue for lessee-derived injuries, see
Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), af 'd, 332 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1964) (alternative holding) (lessors lack standing); Erone v. Skouras Theatres
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (lessor denied standing because only incidentally
injured); and Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. fr 68,537 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
(lessor granted standing on basis of entitlement to percentage of lessee's gross receipts).
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A third example of the failure of the categorization approach is the
series of cases analyzing plaintiffs' recovery rights as they are affected
by "passing-on" in chains of distribution and supply. Although the
law in this area has been settled by the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,7 1 an examination of its historical develop-
ment underscores the problems inherent in the direct injury rule and
provides the background for a critique of the Illinois Brick decision
in Part IV.
Before the ascendancy of the direct injury rule, the problem of
passing-on was thought to present only a factual question: Who had
actually paid the illegal overcharge? In the Oil Jobber Cases of the
1940s, for example, gasoline distributors were denied recovery be-
cause they could not demonstrate that they had not passed on to their
service station customers the defendant oil companies' conspiratorial
price increases. 72 The courts in these cases found, as a factual rather
than legal matter,73 that the plaintiffs' presumed passing-on of the
price increases under guaranteed mark-up contracts negated the pos-
sibility of establishing injury, a required element of a private anti-
trust claim under § 4. The opinions also noted in dicta that more
remote purchasers in the chain of distribution would have a right of
action against the defendants if they could prove that they had paid
higher prices without, in turn, passing them on.7 4
Despite these and subsequent treatments of passing-on as a question
71. 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
72. Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); McCain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 64 F. Supp. 12 (W.D.
Mo. 1945); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944),
aff'd, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Leonard v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir.
1942); H.E. Miller Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 37 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
See Comment, Proof Requirements in Anti-Trust Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage
Recovery, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 130, 136-38 (1950) (Oil Jobber Cases ignored potential volume
losses and enforcement rationale of treble damages). In the one passing-on case decided
prior to the Oil Jobber Cases, the question of passing-on was also treated as a matter of
fact, not law. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 F. 791, 800-04 (2d Cir. 1924).
73. See, e.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) (plaintiff "failed to prove any loss"); Twin
Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644
(1941) ("failure to show lessened margins"); McCain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 64 F.
Supp. 12, 14 (W.D. Mo. 1945) (existence of injury "cannot be reached on a motion for a
summary judgment").
74. See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) (§ 4 rights "not confined to persons in privity with the
wrongdoer"); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (f7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) (plaintiff need not sue the person to whom
he has paid illegal prices and may recover from any defendant if he shows the con-
spiracy's direct effect is to injure him).
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of fact for determination by trial courts,-r many courts began in the
1960s to treat passing-on as a question of law. In two of the celebrated
electrical equipment price-fixing cases of the early 1960s, electricity
consumers were held to lack standing to seek passed-on damages from
electrical equipment manufacturers. Their alleged injuries, suffered
through rate increases by electric utility companies, were regarded as
too "remote" 76 from the locus of the conspiracy. 77
The Supreme Court's 1968 passing-on decision in Hanover Shoe T8
increased the fact-law confusion. The Court held that a pass-on
defense was unavailable as a matter of law against the so-called direct
purchaser, the first purchaser in the chain of distribution.70 The
75. See Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir. 1961) (no proof of
injury); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958) (no
proof that volume reductions were caused by higher prices passed on to ultimate con-
sumers); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 432-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 915 (1955) (no proof of injury because higher prices passed on to ultimate con-
sumers); Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y.1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959) (proof of lost profits and extent
to which alleged overcharges were passed on are questions for jury); Alden-Rochelle, Inc.
v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (no proof of failure by plaintiff to pass on).
76. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961
Trade Cas. ff 70,143, at 78,553 (E.D. Pa. 1961), afj'd on other grounds sub nom.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963). These courts noted, however, that state utility law provisions
for refunds of excessive charges could be 'used by consumers to recover their share of
any damages won by the utility companies in litigation against the equipment manu-
facturers. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 207 F. Supp.
252, 254-56 (N.D. Il. 1962), afrd, 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963).
Relying in part on these holdings, the courts denied the manufacturers' pass-on defense
in suits brought by the utilities lest the manufacturers be insulated from all liability. See
Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 951 (S.D.N. 1965);
Public Utility Dist. No. I v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1964);
Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
denied, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 225 F. Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. II. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
77. Several chain-of-distribution cases at this time also created a potential for char-
acterization confusion, of the sort described supra at pp. 820-22. Some held that
intermediate purchasers that were "consumers" of one item in the course of manufacturing
other items had standing; others characterized intermediate purchasers as "middlemen,"
i.e., resellers of the same product, and denied standing. Compare Freedman v. Phil-
adelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1962) (intermediate pur-
chasers classified as middlemen without standing) with Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 831 (M.D. Pa.), afJ'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960) (intermediate purchaser classified as consumer with
standing) and Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 13, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd per curiant sub nor. Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (intermediate purchasers
characterized as consumers, not middlemen).
78. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
79. Id. at 489. The Court reasoned that the direct purchaser is injured as long as the
price he pays the seller is illegally high: regardless of the steps he takes in response to
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decision was interpreted by a number of lower courts as implicitly
denying standing to indirect purchasers. These courts denied standing
because of concern that defendants might be found liable to both
indirect and direct purchasers for injury suffered only by the former.80
More recently, however, other courts refused to find an implied direct
purchaser limitation in the language or holding of Hanover Shoe and
treated passing-on in suits by ultimate consumers as a question of fact
presenting solvable tracing problems.8' Where direct and indirect
the overcharges (e.g., increasing price to maintain profit margins), "his profits would
be greater were his costs lower." Id. The Court also noted that, as a practical matter, the
defendant would face "nearly insuperable difficulty" in demonstrating that the plaintiff
would not have sold at the same price even if the cost of defendant's input had been
lower. Id. at 492-93. But cf. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 438 F.2d 1380, 1382
(8th Cir. 1971) (passing-on, by state government to federal government, of defendant's
illegal overcharge for highway steel presented mixed question of law and fact).
The Hanover Shoe decision left open the possibility that a pass-on defense might be
permissible where an overcharged buyer had a "pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract" or
similar arrangement with the seller. 392 U.S. at 494. See Obron v. Union Camp Corp.,
355 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afj'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973) (pass-
ing-on defense allowed against a first purchaser whose profit margin was protected by
seller-defendant's price list; reliance on Hanover Shoe exception for direct purchasers
with cost-plus contracts).
80. E.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 483-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (indirect purchasers once removed could not sue); In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 350 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974) ("immediate" but not "remote" purchasers may sue); Balmac, Inc.
v. American Metal Prods. Co., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972); City of Akron
v. Laub Baking Co., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (only direct purchasers in
proposed class could sue); Travis v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa.
1972); City of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13,
30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a! 'd per curiamu sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
A number of these courts, in denying standing to "indirect" purchasers, relied on
Justice Holmes's dictum in Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S.
531, 533-34 (1918), that "it]he general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at
least, is not to go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences to
a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss." See,
e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Darnell-Taenzer, however, was decided under the Interstate Commerce Act's special
provisions for reparations to shippers, at a time when privity was generally required for
tort liability. Most courts have declined to accord either the case, or the now-discredited
privity doctrine, any significance in interpretations of § 4 of the Clayton Act. E.g., Boshes
v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 594-95 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See Comment, Mangano
and Ultitnate-Consuner Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 394, 410 n.95 (1972). But see note 43 supra.
81. E.g., Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub
nora. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977); In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974);
Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); National
Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F. Snpp. 620, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ff 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. IlL. 1973). For pre-Hanover opinions taking
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purchasers sued simultaneously, these courts avoided duplicative re-
coveries by direct purchasers simply by requiring an apportionment
of damages among the different plaintiffs.8 2
Owing to this division of views over the correct interpretation of
Hanover Shoe, 3 the standing of indirect purchasers to seek antitrust
damages in the period before the Illinois Brick decision exhibited the
same syndrome of hopelessly contradictory holdings apparent in the
other standing categories.8 4 Standing was denied to consumers who
bought bread from supermarkets that in turn had bought from the
defendant conspirators.8 Yet standing was granted to state govern-
ments that bought door hardware through construction contractors,
who had bought from hardware distributors, who had in turn bought
from the defendant manufacturers.8 6
The Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois Brick has brought to a close
the controversy over the standing of purchasers in the chain of distribu-
tion. Despite its recognition that all purchasers may well suffer injury,
the Court held that, with minor exceptions, indirect purchasers as a
matter of law lack "injury" within the meaning of § 4.87 Yet this
this approach, see Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 210-11 (8th Cir.
1967) (injury to indirect purchaser a factual question); and Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge
& Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169, 177 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (passing-on a factual issue not affecting
standing). Cf. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer, Inc., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971) (consumer recovery approved where single intermediate purchaser
used percentage mark-up system).
82. E.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), ccrt.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
83. The split in the circuits over the standing of indirect purchasers under § 4 was
noted in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611, 4613 n.8 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
84. This disagreement over the applicability of an immediate purchaser barrier to
proof of damage claims based on alleged passing-on survived the Supreme Court's 1969
decision in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969). There the Court ruled that
no "artificial limitation" should preclude the plaintiff from showing that discriminatory
prices had been passed through three levels of distribution in order to favor his com-
petitors in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 648.
Fewer than half of the post-Perkins cases cited in note 81 supra referred to Perkins in
granting or denying standing to indirect purchasers. The reason why Perhins was not
conclusive as to the standing of plaintiffs injured by passing-on is that the case arose
under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970), rather than under § 4. 395 U.S. at 644, 640.
85. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
86. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. jf 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
For an example of similar contradiction in a different factual context, compare In re Anti-
biotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (standing of remote pur-
chasers-buyers of finished animal feed products containing antibiotic drug-denied as a
matter of law) with In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(standing of remote purchasers-health insurers and others similarly situated-to be
decided only after full development of facts).
87. The Court retained a single, narrow class of exceptions to its exclusion of indirect
purchasers: such purchasers may sustain § 4 injuries if they purchase through "cost-plus"
contracts or through other arrangements between the direct purchaser and subsequent
purchasers that supersede "market forces." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4615 & n.16.
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decision only perpetuates the arbitrariness of the results flowing from
a categorization test for purchasers at different levels in a chain of
distribution. Those consumers who buy directly from antitrust vio-
latorsss will still be able to recover for their injuries, while those buy-
ing through intermediaries will not. Indeed, the Illinois Brick decision
creates distinctions among direct and indirect purchasers situated at
any given level in a chain of distribution, irrespective of the relative
size of their injuries.8 9 Although the endorsement of a direct pur-
chaser category in Illinois Brick gives this area of antitrust standing
the guise of consistency, in fact it serves only to maintain the familiar
arbitrary disparities.
Thus, in suits by indirect purchasers in chains of distribution, as in
suits by employees and lessors, the treatment of similarly situated
plaintiffs is erratic.90 The circuits are in open conflict; in some cases,
88. E.g., Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1
Trade Cas.) r 61,250 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1547 (9th Cir. Jan. 26,
1977) (consumers buying from retail department stores; standing denied on other
grounds).
89. In the Illinois Brick case itself, for example, some end-purchaser governmental
plaintiffs purchased bricks directly, others indirectly. 45 U.S.L.AV. at 4613 n.6. For other
cases in which the Illinois Brick holding would bifurcate the class of plaintiffs, see In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
919 (1974) (direct and indirect governmental purchases of asphalt by some plaintiffs);
and Complaint at f 14, Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Arabian-American Oil Co., No. 75-C-135,
and Complaint at f 16, Lefrak v. Arabian-American Oil Co., No. 74-C-1700, consolidated
in Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 405 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (on file with Yale
Law Journal) (direct and indirect purchasers of heating oil in consolidated companion
suits).
90. Numerous other "categories" of antitrust plaintiffs exist, in addition to em-
ployees, lessors, and indirect purchasers, and the standing of plaintiffs in some of these
categories admits of no greater certainty than that in the categories discussed in text.
The following sample is representative: (i) Patentees: see Productive Inventions, Inc. v.
Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (patentee
had no standing to recover from licensee's competitor for loss of royalties on sales that
licensee might have made but for competitor's alleged antitrust violations); Moraine
Prods. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 73,807 (N.D. 111. 1971) (standing);
SCM v. Radio Corp. of America, 276 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), af 'd, 407 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969) (no standing); La Chappelle v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 90 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1950) (standing). (ii) Other licensors: see Schwartz v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (copyright holders had standing to
press some claims but not others). (iii) Franchisors: see Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv.,
Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (franchisor had no
standing to recover for insurance companies' alleged restraint of trade in sponsoring
certain appraisers to exclusion of franchisees); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D.
373 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dicta) (no standing). (iv) Suppliers of injured parties: see Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 907 (1963) (supplier of asphalt to roofing materials company had no standing to
recover damages resulting from antitrust injuries to its customer); Al Barnett & Son v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974) (no standing); Minersville Coal Co.
v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 335 F. Supp. 360 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (no standing); Denver Petro-
leum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 309 (D. Colo. 1969) (no standing); Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956) (no standing).
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they are beset with internal strife. And even where a seeming consis-
tency has been impressed on the law, the practical results under the
"categorization" approach are likely to remain contradictory.
2. The "Target Area" Approach to Direct Injury
Perhaps as a reaction to the arbitrariness that the categorization ap-
proach has fostered, a number of courts have adopted what has been
called the "target area" test of directness of antitrust injury.91 Plain-
tiffs who are held to be "targets" of a violation, or to be within its
"target area," are granted standing to sue, while those not "targets,"
or outside the "target area," are precluded by indirectness from prov-
ing their claims. 92 Although this test is often said to be distinct from
the direct injury rule,93 in practice most courts treat the target area
rubric as a test for directness of injury.94
The target area approach is riddled with inconsistencies. Originally,
a § 4 plaintiff was held to lie within the target area of an antitrust
violation if he was within "that area of the economy which is en-
dangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
(v) Associations suing for their own damages: see Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents,
Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974)
(unincorporated association had no standing to recover for decrease in membership and
dues suffered as a result of defendants' allegedly illegal termination of contracts with
insurance agents); Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. r 60,786 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (no standing); cf. Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1611 (1977) (standing doctrine confused with real
party in interest rule). (vi) Purchasers from companies illegally acquired in violation of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act: see Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. IIl. 1964) (no
standing).
91. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127-29 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (collecting target area cases and calling target area ap-
proach superior to categorization approach, which is "unsatisfactory insofar as it trans-
forms judicial inquiry into a mere search for labels"); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petro-
leum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Md. 1974) (target area test "far more
logical and flexible" than direct injury categories, which exalt "form over substance").
92. See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Karseal Corp. v. Rich-
field Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
93. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 10, at 382-91; In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Midway Enterprises,
Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-44 (D. Md. 1974).
94. See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE Ra. REP. (CCH) (1977-1
Trade Cas.) fr 61,360, at 71,268 (D. Minn. 1977). The Ninth Circuit originally developed
the target area concept as a test for directness of injury. See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.,
193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
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industry." 95 Perhaps not surprisingly, the effort to ascertain which
parties are actually within the "endangered" area has spawned numer-
ous reformulations of the target area test, for any person in any market
who is in fact adversely affected by an antitrust violation is arguably
within a sector threatened by a "breakdown of competitive condi-
tions." 96 The extrapolative possibilities of the ballistic metaphor, of
course, are almost limitless, and the courts have not been lax in ex-
ploring them. Judicial reformulations of the test have generated hold-
ings that a party was "'hit' ... squarely" and not merely "sideswiped
or struck by a carom shot;"9 7 plaintiffs also have been held to be "not
even on the firing range" of the alleged violation. 98 In the Ninth
Circuit, the test has often been restated as an index of foreseeability:
a § 4 plaintiff is within the target area of a violation if he is "in the
area which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected" by an
antitrust salvo.99
Interchangeable use by some courts of the terms "target" and "target
area," 100 as well as suggestions that an actual "target" must be "aimed
95. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
96. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n,
483 F.2d 384, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1973), amended, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974) ("the 'target'
theory logically can encompass any claim of damage" in the area affected by the con-
spiracy).
97. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 923 (1971).
98. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1361 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1108 (1977) ("One need not be sitting on the
bull's-eye in order to be within the target area .... "); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 10, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3734 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1977) (No. 76-1403) (plaintiff "in the
direct line of fire"); International Rys. of Cent. America v. United Brands Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1365, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976)
("The rifle range metaphor certainly excludes the shotgun, but does it always also ex-
clude the rifleman who shoots in an arc aiming at more than one person?"). The
language of "aim" and "target aimed at" may suggest misleadingly that proof of actual
intent to injure the plaintiff is relevant to the "target area" standing inquiry. The
courts, however, consistently have approached the question as one of law rather than of
fact, treating the concept of "aiming" as part of a metaphor rather than as a require-
ment of volition. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
99. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964),
quoted in Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) and Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 495 (9th Cir.
1967). See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1975); Isidor Wein-
stein Inv. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1969). But see Calderone
Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (rejecting foreseeability test as too broad).
100. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975) (re-
ferring to targets and target areas in successive sentences as seemingly the same); Cal-
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at,"'' 1 have created uncertainty about this potentially broad standing
test.10 2 Although most courts permit anyone within the "target area"
to sue, whether or not they can be identified as targets, some courts
grant standing only to parties who are unambiguously objects of a
violation.10 3 Even among courts adopting the target area test, the
periphery of the target area remains ill-defined. Some courts have
considered the target area to embrace effects in sectors of the economy
located two distinct markets away from the market in which the
violation occurred. 0 4  Other courts have drawn the perimeter of
the target area narrowly, confining it to markets in which the de-
fendant is situated and thus in effect creating a "competitors only"
standing rule. 0 5 One court has even implied that a target could be
outside the target area and thus without standing to sue.'0 6
derone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295, 1296
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (treating "targets" as parties identified
by "target area" test).
101. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. 454 F.2d 1292,
1296 & nn.2 & 3 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); see Kemp Pontiac-
Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Automotive Dealers' Ass'n, 380 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-87 (D. Conn.
1974). Courts that narrowly construe the "target area" test as a "target" test seem to have
relied in part on the categorization approach to determining direct injury. See, e.g., Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (combining target area language with observation that plaintiff utili-
ties were "at least equally remote" from antitrust violation as, e.g., landlords, suppliers,
employees, and consumers); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (combining target
area language with categorization approach to lessor cases).
102. See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
418-19 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (suggesting an expansive conception of
"target area"); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp.
1339, 1343-45 (D. Md. 1974) (same).
103. Compare Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967) (owner of gaso-
line station granted standing even though exclusive dealing restraint was directed at
gasoline wholesalers) with Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (non-operating
lessor of movie theater denied standing since not target of block-booking conspiracy
"aimed" at exhibitors and distributors).
104. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966) (milk producers selling through intermediate
market level have standing to sue franchised retail grocery stores).
105. See, e.g., Campo v. National Football League, 334 F. Supp. 1181, 1186-87 (E.D.
La. 1971) (court apparently considered "area . . . endangered by a breakdown in com-
petitive conditions" to be industry in which defendant operated). The categorization ap-
proach too has been criticized for tending to deny standing to all but competitors. Cromar
Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cas. ff 60,373, at 66,627-28 (M.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
106. See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). The court denied standing to the plaintiff franchisor on the
ground that the target area of the defendant franchisors' alleged anticompetitive acts
was the marketing of bottled beverages and plaintiff's involvement with its franchised
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Because of these ambiguities, the target area test for direct injury
has not reduced the level of contradiction in the law of antitrust
standing. Indeed, inconsistent applications of this test can be dis-
cerned among different circuits and even within the same circuit. In
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,10 7 for example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that a franchisor-manufacturer, whose franchised distribu-
tors sold his products to retailers, was within the target area of an
exclusive dealing agreement between retailers and a distributor of
another manufacturer's brand of the same product. 08 In Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 00 however, the Second Circuit ruled that a
plaintiff franchisor, injured by an alleged conspiracy among competing
franchisors to foreclose his franchised soft drink bottlers from selling
plaintiff's brand of soft drinks to retailers, was not within the target
area. The Billy Baxter court implied that the plaintiff's franchisees
alone lay within the target area and that the franchisor lacked standing
because of his nominal involvement in their day-to-day business.110
The status of Billy Baxter is somewhat unclear even in the Second
Circuit, however. In Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co.,"' a district court in
the Southern District of New York recently held that a supplier of
soft drink concentrates to franchised bottlers was within the target
area of an alleged conspiracy among soft drink franchisors. to preclude
the plaintiff's product from access to retail markets. The Sulmeyer
court distinguished Billy Baxter on the unconvincing 'ground that
whereas the franchisor in Billy Baxter had had only a limited role in
bottlers was insufficiently close to bring it within the target area. "Yet in any case," the
court went on to suggest,
even if the [defendants] violated the law to help themselves or their franchisees at the
expense of [plaintiff's franchisees], while knowing that this would also be an effective
way of depriving a rival franchisor of royalties, the causal link between the type
of violation alleged and an appropriate plaintiff would still be lacking in this suit.
Id. at 189. The court's conclusion seems to be that even had it been a target, the plaintiff
could not have been within the target area.
107. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
108. Id. at 364-65.
109. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
110. Id. at 189. For a similar view of contradiction between these two cases, see
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUMf. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1971). For other
instances of conflicting holdings on similar facts under the "target area" test, compare
Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971) (licensor had standing) with Fields Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318
F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd inern., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 949 (1971) (licensor lacked standing); and compare Isidor Weinstein Inv. Co. v.
Hearst Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (employee had standing; complaint dis-
missed on other grounds) with Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade
Cas. ff 73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (employees lacked standing).
111. 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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its franchisees' businesses, the Sulmeyer franchisor's "substantial as-
sistance" to its franchisees brought it within the target area of the
conspiracy.- 12
The ambiguities inherent in the target area approach, and the
inter- and intra-circuit conflicts those ambiguities have wrought, are
not the only shortcomings of the target area test. An additional prob-
lem is that many of the holdings rendered under it contradict at least
some rulings rendered under the categorization approach to direct
injury. The two approaches, for example, have produced disparate
results in suits brought by employees" 13 and by lessors,11 notwith-
standing that the cases presented similar facts. There appears to be no
principled argument that can reconcile these holdings.
112. Id. at 638 & n.4. In particular, the court noted that the Sulmeyer franchisor al-
legedly not only franchised bottlers and supplied concentrate to them but also manu-
factured concentrates, "supplied advertising and promotional material, offered sub-
stantial assistance to its franchisees, and was actively involved in supervising the work of
the franchisees." Id. at 638. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff's injury was
less "remote" than that of the Billy Baxter franchisor, which apparently had not en-
gaged in these additional activities. Id. at 638-39.
The Ninth Circuit also seems to be on the verge of intra-circuit conflict over the
application of the target area test. Some panels in the circuit have invoked the foresee-
ability formulation of the test to grant plaintiffs standing. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974) (in-
direct purchaser in chain of distribution foreseeably injured by price-fixing conspiracy);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 880 (1964) (plaintiff within area "which it could reasonably be foreseen would
be affected" by defendant's actions). Significantly, discussion of foreseeability has been
notably absent from Ninth Circuit opinions denying standing. See, e.g., In re Multi-
district Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973) (denying standing to farmers suing for crop damage due to conspiracy to suppress
automotive antipollution devices; no discussion of foreseeability). This may be attributable
to the difficulty of placing bounds on "foreseeable" injuries. See Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (" 'foreseeability' test ... would permit anyone to sue").
Whether some Ninth Circuit panels denying standing can continue to ignore other panels'
foreseeability formulation remains to be seen."
113. Target area cases granting standing to employees, e.g., Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile
Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976); Isidor Weinstein Inv. Co. v. Hearst
Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Cal. 1969), conflict with categorization cases that deny it
on similar facts, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976). By the same token, categorization cases granting standing to employees, e.g.,
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967), conflict with target area
cases that deny it on similar facts, e.g., Hans Hansen Welding Co. v. American Ship
Building Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. ff 74,739 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Bywater v. Matshushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. rl 73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
114. Target area cases granting standing to lessors, e.g., Johnson v. Ready Mix Concrete
Co., 318 F. Supp. 930 (D. Neb. 1970), conflict with categorization cases that deny it on
similar facts, e.g., Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954). Similarly, cat-
egorization cases granting standing to lessors, e.g., Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.,
246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957), conflict with target area cases that deny it on similar facts,
e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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Thus, the target area test, in its attempt to explicate the direct in-
jury standard, has produced only greater uncertainty. In view of the
inherent variability in the test's scope, it seems unlikely that any
single formulation of the test-were it to emerge-would yield uni-
formity in the treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs. The "en-
dangered area" formulation offers no sure guide. As noted above,115
it can readily include any plaintiff, and therefore fails to provide
workable rules for defining a subset of antitrust plaintiffs with stand-
ing to invoke the treble damage remedy of § 4. Nor does the foresee-
ability analogy from tort law serve as an adequate explication of the
target area test. The concept of foreseeability is arguably irrelevant,
for all antitrust injuries are intentionally rather than negligently in-
flicted. 116 Foreseeability, moreover, is highly susceptible to contradic-
tory judicial interpretations." 7 Only actual intent to injure particular
plaintiffs would provide a definite guide for determining who were
the targets of a violation. Yet under this criterion, standing not only
would be fortuitously governed by the difficulty or ease of proof of
intent in particular cases but also would be contrary to substantive
antitrust law, which has dispensed with the element of specific in-
tent.128 In sum, the target area test of direct injury is no more capable
than the categorization approach of achieving the desired goal of the
direct injury rule: to carve out from the universe of persons injured
by antitrust violations those who are to be protected under § 4.119
C. Antitrust Standing and Substantive Antitrust Protection
In recent years a number of judicial opinions have failed to distin-
guish between antitrust standing and the scope of protection under
substantive antitrust law. The distinction, however, is critical. When
115. See p. 831 supra.
116. Antitrust violations are intentional even if all the resulting injuries are not, and
under well-established tort law principles they would generate liability for all of their
provable consequences. See Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491-92
(2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.) (antitrust violation a tort). See generally Note, Intentional
Tortfeasors, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 362 (1962). Accordingly, to the extent that antitrust courts
use a tort analogy to define the scope of § 4, it would be appropriate for them to look
to the broad scope of liability recognized for intentional torts rather than the narrower
scope of liability associated with negligent torts.
117. Handler, supra note 110, at 28-31. See note 112 supra.
118. The substantive rule is that the harmful effect of an antitrust violation on
economic welfare is sufficient to give rise to antitrust liability. See Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). Cf. Coleman Motors Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (evidence of predatory practices sufficient for finding
of intent to monopolize).
119. Enthusiasts of the target area test have been able to offer only a hope that in
the future it might be "pragmatically applied." Sherman, supra note 10, at 406.
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an antitrust violation occurs, it causes injury, whether directly or in-
directly, to a class of persons who are entitled to the protection of the
antitrust laws. The standing doctrine is designed to narrow this broad
class of injured persons to a subclass of plaintiffs who are deemed
proper parties to sue. The scope of antitrust standing should be de-
termined by reference to the special problems created by treble dam-
age actions, such as ruinous or duplicative recoveries. The scope of
substantive protection should be determined in each case by analysis
of pertinent substantive antitrust policies.
Whether a party's interests are protected by antitrust policy and
whether that party has standing are thus discrete questions. Confusion
of these questions may or may not alter the outcome in a particular
case. But the law of standing is bound to be distorted if courts over-
look the doctrinal confusion of earlier cases and rely in their standing
decisions on holdings that were really grounded in judgments about
substantive protection. Regardless of the practical effects of this con-
fusion in a given case, the misconceived equation of antitrust standing
and antitrust protection may lead some courts to expand unduly the
scope of standing and others to constrict unduly the scope of protection.
The confusion is exemplified in Southern Concrete Co. v. United
States Steel Corp.,120 where the plaintiff challenged certain tying and
exclusive dealing practices.' 2 ' The plaintiff was not in fact protected
against these practices under the antitrust prohibition against tying,
since it was neither a foreclosed seller of the tied product nor the
coerced purchaser of the tying product. 22 The court so held; but it
also stated that since the plaintiff was not protected by the antitrust
laws' prohibition of tying arrangements, 123 the plaintiff was outside
120. 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1113 (1977).
121. Id. at 315. The plaintiff was a competitor of one of the defendants in the ready-
mix concrete business. The plaintiff alleged that United States Steel, as a supplier of
cement to concrete producers, had illegally conditioned favorable credit terms on the
defendant competitor's purchase of all its cement needs from USS. The favorable financ-
ing obtained from USS, the plaintiff charged, had enabled its competitor to drive it
and other firms out of the ready-mix concrete business. Id.
122. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962); Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 565 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1961); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
123. Besides alleging tying arrangements in violation of § I of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975), and exclusive dealing arrangements in violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act, id. § 14 (1970), the plaintiff alleged monopolization of the ready-mix con-
crete market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, id. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). 535 F.2d
315-16 & nn.2, 4. The trial court had granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the first
two allegations, but had held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action with respect to
the third. Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362, 378-80
(N.D. Ga. 1975), afrd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1113 (1977).
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the target area of the violation.12 4 Thus, the court seemed to. suggest
that the target area of the violation was coextensive with the scope
of substantive antitrust protection.125
A similar confusion underlies the opinion in Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac,
Inc. v. Hartford Automobile Dealers' Ass'n.120 In that case, an auto-
mobile dealer alleged price fixing by a group of conspiring competi-
tors. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim on the grounds that he was not a
target of the alleged conspiracy, the court seemed to rely on a deter-
mination that the plaintiff-competitor was not protected by substantive
antitrust law because he could not have been injured by the con-
spiracy to raise prices.' 27 Southern Concrete and Kemp present a sce-
nario that commonly leads courts astray. Where an antitrust violation
has occurred and the plaintiff alleges an injury against which third
parties, but not he, are protected by the antitrust laws, the court may
say that the plaintiff lacks standing instead of saying that he lacks
protection.
The mistaken equation of standing and substantive protection also
has arisen occasionally in merger cases. Mergers typically cause numer-
ous economic dislocations and injuries, only some of which will flow
from any anticompetitive aspects the merger may have. For example, an
illegal "deep-pocket" merger may keep alive a failing company and
thus injure its competitors only in a procompetitive way, by depriving
them of prospective business, or it may injure competitors in an anti-
competitive way if the merged company's deep pocket is exploited.
The Supreme Court has recognized that whether a party injured by
a merger can sue is often a question of substantive antitrust policy
and depends on whether the injury flows from an aspect of the merger
124. 535 F.2d at 316-17 ("the area of the economy threatened with a breakdown of
competitive conditions because of a tying agreement is the market for the tied product").
125. This suggestion is puzzling, since the court relied on target area cases that con-
sidered the directness of the plaintiff's injury while assuming the existence of antitrust
protection. Id. at 316 (citing Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975);
and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1967)). For other
recent cases confusing standing and substantive protection, see Bowen v. New York News,
Inc., 522 F.2d 1242, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); and Industria
Siciliana Asfalti v. Exxon Research & Eng. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCIH) (1977-1 Trade
Cas.) f 61,256, at 70,779-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
126. 380 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Conn. 1974).
127. Id. at 1386-87 : n.6, 1388 n.8. As the court pointed out, the plaintiff failed to
allege conspiratorial predatory pricing, the only form of price fixing that could have
injured him. Id. at 1388. Unfortunately, the court, like other courts that have confused
substantive protection and standing, succumbed to the temptation to use the target area
terminology in expressing its conclusion that the plaintiff was beyond the scope of sub-
stantive protection. Id. at 1385-86 & n.6.
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that contravenes the procompetitive policy of § 7 of the Clayton Act. 28
Lower federal courts unfortunately have not drawn the distinction
between antitrust standing and the substantive law. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, for example, in an opinion denying standing to private anti-
merger plaintiffs on the grounds that they lay outside the target area
of the merger, stressed that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were not
caused by any anticompetitive aspects of the merger. 1- 0 Since, like
Southern Concrete, the merger opinions implicitly or explicitly equate
antitrust standing with antitrust injury,130 they likewise conflict with
the reasoning of standing opinions that use the categorization and
target area concepts to create a subset of protected plaintiffs who may
sue.
A related source of confusion between the scope of antitrust stand-
ing and of the substantive law is the importation from administrative
law of the "zone of interests" test for standing to challenge adminis-
trative agency action. In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,'31 the Sixth
Circuit held that anyone "arguably . . . within the zone of interests
protected" by the antitrust laws had standing to sue under § 4.132 By
referring to the "interests" to be protected, the Malamud court in-
vited attention to the reach of the underlying policies sought to be
enforced, not to whether the antitrust plaintiff was injured with suf-
ficient directness to enforce them. In effect, the court repudiated any
128. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690, 695-97 (1977) (con-
struing § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 US.C. § 18 (1970)). The Brunswick plaintiff was a
bowling center operator whose principal competitor in several geographical markets had
been saved from going out of business by an allegedly illegal deep-pocket asset acqui-
sition by the defendant. The plaintiff sought damages in the amount of profits it would
have earned had the acquisition not kept its competitor alive. 97 S. Ct. at 694. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's lost profits did not amount to "antitrust injury"
under § 7, reasoning that the plaintiff's injury flowed only from the procompetitive
preservation of its competitor. Id. at 696-97.
129. John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1
Trade Cas.) ff 61,353 (9th Cir. 1977). See Kirihara v. Bendix, 306 F. Supp. 72, 88-91 (D.
Hawaii 1969).
130. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) (GAF held to have suffered no antitrust damages; "[t]hus,
whether GAF is viewed as not having 'standing to sue' for these alleged violations of the
antitrust laws, or, is viewed as not having sustained anticompetitive damages from the
particular acts alleged, the result under § 4 is the same.
131. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 1152 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). In Data Processing, the Court held that one "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question" had standing to seek judicial review of agency action under 5
U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1968) (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West Supp. 1977)). 397
U.S. at 153. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HAsv. L. REV. 1671, 1725-34 (1975).
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proximate cause limitation on antitrust standing and required only
that a party be protected by the substantive law.133
In the cases discussed above, the courts either explicitly, as in Mala-
mud, or by negative implication, as in Kemp and Southern Concrete,
expanded the perimeters of antitrust standing by suggesting that if a
party is protected he has standing. The confusion, of course, can work
in reverse. Some courts have suggested, contrapositively, that plaintiffs
who lack standing are unprotected. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co. 34 provides an example. In that case a franchisor that was injured
through predatory pricing by its franchisees' competitors was held to
be outside the target area of the violation. 35 Yet the court also in-
timated that indirectly injured suppliers of competitors were simply
not protected by the prohibition against predatory pricing. 36 This
holding is at odds with substantive antitrust policy, which protects
against both directly and indirectly caused injuries to economic wel-
fare. Indeed, courts have permitted "indirectly" injured plaintiffs,
without standing to sue for damages, to seek injunctive relief under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act.137 Thus, the Billy Baxter decision, despite its
invocation of substantive policy considerations, was effectively a stand-
ing decision, one that redefined substantive policy to limit antitrust
protection to "directly" injured plaintiffs. 38
The mingling of doctrines concerning antitrust standing and anti-
trust protection is a development that gives cause for concern. Not
133. For similar use of the "zone of interests" test, see Leeward Petroleum, Ltd. v.
Mene Grande Oil Co., 5 TRADE RE. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,423, at 71,569
(D. Del. 1976). See also E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tours Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 183-85 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (antitrust
injury said to confer standing to sue).
134. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
135. Id. at 188, 189.
136. Id. at 188.
137. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 130 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Nader v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,280, at 70,882-83 (D.D.C. 1977). But see Nassau County
Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151, 1154 n.4 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974). There is no more basis for a direct injury restriction
in the legislative history of the substantive sections of the antitrust laws than in that
of § 4.
138. Billy Baxter is not the only instance where a narrow interpretation of antitrust
standing apparently led to a narrow definition of antitrust protection. See Reibert v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 730-32 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973)
(employee fired in allegedly illegal merger both indirectly injured and outside scope of
antimerger policy's protection, which extends only to "suppliers"). Compare Fields Prods.,
Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem., 432 F.2d
1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (narrow view of standing; substantive
protection confined to traditionally protected plaintiffs) with Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn
Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) (broad view of
standing leads to broader scope of substantive protection than in Fields).
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only may it exacerbate the confusion over standing, but, as Billy
Baxter demonstrates, it may also lead to distortion of applicable sub-
stantive law. Even more ominous, perhaps, is the danger that sub-
stantive antitrust law may fall heir to the conflicts that have plagued,
and continue to plague, the house of antitrust standing.
D. The Unhappy State of Antitrust Standing Law
The decisional morass reviewed in the preceding sections demon-
strates that the direct injury rule, whether implemented through the
categorization test or the target area test,139 is an unsatisfactory guide
to the scope of private antitrust standing. The uncertainty generated
by the rule not only encourages inconsistent treatment of similarly
situated plaintiffs but also frequently occasions massive expenditures of
resources merely to litigate the standing issue.140 There is, moreover,
an emerging realization among courts and commentators that the law
of antitrust standing currently lacks an analytical framework that
could make 6rder out of the chaos.' 41
139. Although the target area test is now used more frequently than the categorization
test, no circuit court uses either test exclusively. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
for the most part can be denominated as target area courts, while in the First, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits the categories of directly and indirectly injured plaintiffs predominate,
or have until recently predominated. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131
(5th Cir. 1975); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (collecting cases through 1973). The Sixth Circuit has
apparently switched from the direct injury test to the "zone of interests" test used to
determine standing in administrative review cases. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,
521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975); p. 838 & note 132 supra. In the Third Circuit the law
is now quite unclear. This court in the past has employed both the categorization
test, Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976),
and the target area test, International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Con-
tractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), ainended, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974). It now
apparently uses both the direct injury rule ada-a policy analysis. See Bravman v. Bassett
Furniture Indus., Inc., 5 TRADE REG. RFa'. (CcH) (,977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,300, at 70,974 (3d
Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W: 378G (U.S. May 13, 1977) (No. 76-1597) (there
is "no talismanic test capable of resolving'all-§ 4 standing problems" but directness of
injury is one factor in balancing test); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp.,
543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976) (retaining direct injury rule as part of policy analysis). In
the Fourth Circuit, an admixture of the categorization and target area approaches can
be found. See South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
417-20 (4th Cir. 1966). The Seventh Circuit now seems to employ both the "zone of in-
terests" and the target area tests. See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th
Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illin6isi45',U.S.L.WV . 4611 (U.S. June 9,
1977). The most recent standing pronouncement from. the: Eighth Circuit refers to both
categorization and target area tests with approval. See Satiiary Milk Producers v. Bergjans
Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). The ]Digtrict'6f Columbia Circuit appar-
ently has not yet confronted the antitrust standing issue.
140. See Klingsberg, Bulls Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on
Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRrST BULL.
351, 353 (1971) ("The prospect of expensive and time-consuming motion practice on
[standing] may deter private enforcement.")
141. The courts have expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the current state of
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The absence of a coherent analytical framework for antitrust stand-
ing may be traced to four factors. First, although the legislative history
of § 4 is broadly favorable to private enforcement actions, 142 Congress
gave no consideration to the potential conflict between the aims of
compensation and deterrence and the existence of competing policies,
such as that against ruinous damage awards, that on occasion may
militate against private recovery. Lacking congressional guidance as
to how to strike an appropriate balance, 4 3 it is perhaps not surprising
that the judiciary adopted the legalistic direct injury rule of antitrust
standing. The rule may well owe its currency to the inertia of stare
decisis.144
Second, while the Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities
to resolve the competing interests that enter into a standing determi-
the law. See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1147-51 (6th Cir. 1975)
(asserting that both "direct injury" and "target area" approaches go beyond proper func-
tion of standing doctrine, and adopting "zone of interests" test); Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1252, 1298 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (Levet, J., dissenting) ("judicial requirements of directness and
the 'target area' test have frequently been imprecisely defined and applied"; such "labels"
should be subordinated to "fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws"); Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971)
(Waterman, J., dissenting) (use by courts in antitrust analysis of "inherited decisional
labels obfuscate[s] the position of some plaintiffs"); International Rys. of Cent. America
v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976) (antitrust standing "policy considerations are not necessarily
an ingredient of logical analysis"); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp.
699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970) ("antitrust standing cases more than a little confusing and
certainly beyond our powers of reconciliation").
The commentators have been no less critical. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 110, at
24-31; Klingsberg, supra note 140, at 353-55; Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLuss. L. Rav. 570, 586-88 (1964); Comment,
Standing under Clayton § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DicK. L. REv. 73, 83-87 (1972) (but
considering Billy Baxter a resolution to the conflict).
142. See note 9 supra; pp. 845-46 infra.
143. Some courts have inferred, from the silence of successive post-1890 Congresses,
an implied congressional endorsement of the judicially created standing doctrine and the
various tests established under it. E.g., National Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association
of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1967); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956); see Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.) (1914 enactment of Clayton Act to be
interpreted in light of 1910 direct injury ruling in Loeb). This inference of implied con-
gressional approval of current antitrust standing law is tenuous at best, for Congress has
never given the standing doctrines even the bare consideration that would render failure
to change the doctrines an implied endorsement of them. Indeed, considering the con-
trariety of approaches and results in existing antitrust standing law, it is difficult if not
impossible to know which, if any, standing doctrines recent Congresses could be said to
have endorsed implicitly.
144. See, e.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1958)
(L. Hand, J.) ("[a]s a new question it might perhaps be argued" that shareholder has
separate cause of action under antitrust laws, but "this has not been the course of the
decisions"); Minersville Coal Co. v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 335 F. Supp. 360, 365-66
(M.D. Pa. 1971) (declining to deviate from direct injury precedents).
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nation,'1 4  it has thus far refrained from taking advantage of them
outside the area of chain-of-distribution cases. Even in the recent
Illinois Brick decision, establishing that indirect purchasers cannot
sue under § 4, the Court explicitly declined to articulate any prin-
ciples to guide standing determinations. 14 6 And although the Court
has often spoken of the importance of the policies underlying private
antitrust enforcement, 4 7 it has offered no guidance on how to deal
with the countervailing consideration of burdensome damages, a prob-
lem that has troubled the lower courts.
Third, the growing confusion between antitrust standing and sub-
stantive antitrust protection seems to arise from a failure to distinguish
two analytically distinct types of standing. The first is that commonly
found in antitrust cases, namely, the direct injury restriction on who
may recover for injuries against which substantive antitrust law other-
wise offers protection. The second type is the traditional notion that
a person, even if injured, may not complain of an unlawful act against
which only others are protected.1 48 In cases where the substantive law
safeguards specified injured parties, as, for example, in the case of
exclusionary tying practices, it is both necessary and proper to examine
the scope of, the substantive law to ascertain whether the plaintiff is
entitled to protection from the offense. Yet it is necessary to recognize,
as is currently. recognized in other contexts, 4 9 that an inquiry into
plaintiff's entitlement to substantive protection is fundamentally an
inquiry into the merits of his claim for relief.'50 In assessing the merits
of that claim, the "target area" standing terminology is both inapposite
and misleading.
The fourth and most important cause of the analytical impoverish-
ment of antitrust standing law is the direct injury rule itself. The rule
is inherently unworkable. The distinction between direct and indi-
rect injury is arbitrary, even metaphysical, since all antitrust injuries
145. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957). Moreover, the Court has denied certiorari in standing cases employing
all the different approaches to antitrust standing, thus declining to lend the weight of
its authority to any one approach. See, e.g., notes 98, 101 & 138 supra (citing cases).
146. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4612, 4613 n.7 (right of indirect purchasers to recover under § 4
treated as question of "injur[y] within the meaning of § 4"; standing issue "not ad-
dress[ed]").
147. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (dictum).
148. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
149. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 11, at 453, 463.
150. Thus, the invocation of the "arguably protected" standard from administrative
law in Malamud, see 521 F.2d at 1151-52, is perhaps best seen as providing an opportunity
beyond the pleading stage for the introduction of facts sufficient to carry out an informed
inquiry into the merits of a claim of substantive antitrust protection.
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are "direct" to a greater or lesser degree. The line between direct
and indirect injuries must inevitably be drawn in different places by
different courts, often depending on little more than the court's
sense of whether the plaintiff deserves antitrust protection. Standing
determinations thus function as policy judgments but masquerade as
inquiries into legal causation. And the categorization and target area
tests, being mere verbal formulae for implementing the direct injury
rule, are equally unreliable as constructs for standing determinations.
Even if courts reached a consensus on the standing of familiar cate-
gories of plaintiffs, the emergence of "new" categories would inevi-
tably engender renewed disagreement. Likewise, even if the target
area test were eventually disengaged from the direct injury approach,
the inherent elasticity of its core concept of "endangered" area would
preclude the test from renouncing its legacy of arbitrariness and in-
determinacy.
Not every court applies the direct injury rule mechanically. Some
courts have gone so far as to assert that it incorporates antitrust policy
considerations by drawing a meaningful line between windfall or
ruinous recoveries and recoveries that serve the purposes of § 4.151 This
assertion is ill-founded. The manipulability of the direct injury ap-
proach is conducive to avoidance rather than assessment of competing
policy considerations. It is not mere coincidence that courts finding
injury to be "direct" invariably cite policies favoring private enforce-
mentl 2 and courts finding an injury to be "indirect" invariably cite
policies opposing private enforcement. 1 5 3 The rigidity of the direct-
indirect dichotomy also contributes to the inability of the direct in-
jury approach to take account of antitrust policy. The approach could
be made responsive to such policy issues as "overkill" liability only if
courts were willing arbitrarily to find plaintiffs who were in fact di-
rectly injured to be indirectly injured where a real danger of "over-
151. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); Cal-
derone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.,
193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
152. E.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 5 TRADE RG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1
Trade Cas.) j 61,300, at 70,974 (3d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3780
U.S. May 13, 1977) (No. 76-1597); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir.
1967); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 688-89 (8th
Cir. 1966).
153. E.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1045 (1973); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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kill" existed, and indirectly injured ones to be directly injured where
such a danger did not exist. Yet in order to determine whether a real
danger exists, a court would have to engage in precisely the sort of
factual inquiry normally precluded by the direct injury standing bar-
rier. A policy-oriented direct injury approach, in short, is virtually a
contradiction in terms.
Yet a way out of the morass may be found. What is needed is an
approach that openly balances the various interests and policies un-
derlying the treble damage action, and that does so without the
rigidifying overlay and the disingenuous manipulation of the direct
injury rule and its attendant tests.154 Adoption of such an approach
would end the anomalous situation in which a policy approach, em-
bracing both economic and social policies, is used in almost every
aspect of substantive antitrust law- 55 and of private antitrust enforce-
ment, 56 save standing.1 7 In the remainder of this article, therefore,
154. The authors recognize that "balancing" is a much criticized approach to con-
stitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due
Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
We recognize as well that criticism of balancing as an ad hoc and even subjective form
of decisionmaking may apply to balancing approaches in any area of the law. Yet balanc-
ing of competing policy considerations is peculiarly appropriate in an area of the law
that consciously seeks to promote economic policy. The procompetitive value system em-
bodied in the antitrust laws helps frame conflicting interests for evaluation and recon-
ciliation. Indeed, it is incongruous that courts now look to the procompetitive policies of
the antitrust laws in making substantive determinations as to the existence of a violation,
but often ignore policy considerations in standing decisions that determine when private
enforcement of these substantive determinations shall occur.
155. The courts have long viewed the highly general phrases of the antitrust laws'
substantive provisions as a "charter of economic liberty" that is to be liberally inter-
preted and applied by the judiciary to fulfill the antitrust laws' underlying purposes.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,
395 U.S. 642, 647 (1969); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 348-52 (1968); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60 (1933). Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690 (1977) (policy
analysis of Clayton Act § 7 in interaction with § 4).
156. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-94
(1968) (interpreting injury requirement of § 4 in light of deterrence policy); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (same); Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957) (because of important public purposes
of antitrust laws, private litigants should not be burdened by artificial barriers to re-
covery not specifically established by Congress); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-35 (1964) (private
right of action found implied in securities antifraud statute because of need for effective
enforcement).
157. The Third Circuit has recently modified the direct injury rule by treating
it as only one of several "factors" to be considered in determining standing. See Bravman
v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 5 TRADE RaE. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,300
(3d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. May 13, 1977) (No. 76-1597);
Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976). Un-
fortunately these opinions not only fail to indicate how much weight directness of injury
is to be given but also introduce some criteria, such as the nature of the industry in-
volved, that would seem generally irrelevant to standing. E.g., id. Indeed, the judicial
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a fresh approach to antitrust standing is proposed, one that breaks
decisively with tradition by making policy analysis the basis of stand-
ing determinations under § 4.15s Patterns of causation remain relevant
in such an inquiry, of course, but only insofar as they implicate rele-
vant policies.
III. A Policy Approach to Antitrust Standing
The formulation of a policy approach to antitrust standing begins
with the identification of all relevant public policies-those that
prompted congressional enactment of the private antitrust remedy,
those reflected in the antitrust laws generally, and those embodied in
the common law of damages. The identification of the policy interests
that should inform an antitrust standing decision makes it possible
to articulate practical rules for implementing a policy-based standing
inquiry. These rules help determine whether there is an actual con-
flict between policies when a case implicates two or more seemingly
contradictory ones. They also help strike the appropriate balance
when a given case presents genuinely conflicting policies.
A. The Policies Relevant to Antitrust Standing
The private treble damages remedy was enacted to achieve two
great public purposes: compensation for private harm and enforce-
ment of the national economic policy in favor of competition. Orig-
inally passed in 1890 as § 7 of the Sherman Act, the damages provision
was a response to Congress's concern that an antitrust weapon be
"available to the people,"' 9 particularly consumers and "small men
engaged in competition,"'160 who were seen as prime victims of the
trusts. The debates over the Sherman Act manifest Congress's interest
in creating a meaningful compensatory remedy'0 1 as well as an effec-
tive enforcement device.1 2 The same dual objectives were prominent
manipulation that has colored the history of the direct injury rule is discernible even
here, for the Third Circuit failed in Cronzar to mention its direct injury holding a
year earlier in Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976). Yet despite their shortcomings, Bravman and Cromar are promising, albeit
hesitant, departures from the monism of the direct injury approach.
158. A policy analysis, of course, is also desirable in the determination of standing
to seek injunctive antitrust relief under Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), but
special considerations are relevant to that context and will not be developed here. For
a discussion of the law of § 16 standing and of the relevant policy variables, see Nader
v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 5 TADE RFG. Ra'. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,280
at 70,882-83 (D.D.C. 1977). See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 57.
159. 21 CONG. Rac. 3146 (1890) (Sen. Reagan).
160. Id. at 3147, 3150 (Sen. George).
161. See, e.g., id. at 2558 (Sen. Pugh); at 2615 (Sen. Coke); id. at 3147 (Sen. Reagan).
162. See, e.g., id. at 2571 (Sen. Hiscock); id. at 3146 (Sen. Hoar). Indeed, Congress de-
cided to raise Senator Sherman's proposed double damage recovery to treble damages.
845
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 809, 1977
in congressional deliberations nearly a quarter of a century later,
when the Clayton Act was passed to strengthen the Sherman Act. Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, which superseded § 7 of the Sherman Act,
was intended to open "the door of Justice to every man, whenever he
may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws"' 63 and, in
tandem with other provisions, to make "the business public... allies of
the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws." 164 Congress reaf-
firmed these two basic purposes of § 4 during its consideration of the
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.105 They represent the major
policy considerations favoring a broad conception of standing and are
hereinafter referred to as the "positive policies" relevant to antitrust
standing. 66
The compensation policy argues for an expansive scope of § 4 stand-
ing. Insofar as the antitrust laws were intended to provide compre-
hensive protection against diminutions in economic welfare resulting
from artificial restraints on free competition,1 67 anyone injured by
such restraints is an intended beneficiary of the compensation pol-
icy.' 68 Not only competitors' 69 fall within the ambit of this policy, but
Compare id. at 2901 (bill as reported from Senate Judiciary Committee containing treble
damages provision subsequently enacted as § 7 of Sherman Act) with id. at 2455 (earlier
version of bill containing double damages provision).
163. 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914) (Rep. Webb).
164. Id. at 16319 (Rep. Floyd).
165. Pub. L. No. 94-435, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nrws (90 Stat. 1394) (to be
codified in principal part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15a-15h, 18a). See S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, 38, 165 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1976) reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2589 [here-
inafter cited without parallel citation as HoUsE REPORT] ("The antitrust laws clearly
reflect the national policy of encouraging private parties (whether consumers, businesses,
or possible competitors) to help enforce the antitrust laws in order to protect competition
through compensation of antitrust victims, through punishment of antitrust violators, and
through deterrence of antitrust violations.")
166. These compensatory and deterrent policies are generally similar to those served
by private tort litigation. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 35 (1975).
167. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."); SENATE REPORT, supra note 165, at 9
("The Sherman and Clayton Acts represent the basic guardians of our free enterprise
system.")
168. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948) (holding that complaint stated cause of action for treble damages: "The
[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.") For more
recent declarations by the Supreme Court recognizing the compensatory purpose of § 4,
see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690, 696 (1977); Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
169. The compensation policy's protection extends not only to competitors whose
vitality is essential to the maintenance of a competitive market structure but also, in
some cases, to competitors whose injuries do not impair competition generally. Compare
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also consumers170 and suppliers. 71 "Indirect" injury no less than
"direct" injury implicates the compensation policy; it is the adverse
impact on economic welfare, not the mode or distance of transmission,
that supports compensation.
The retrospective character of the compensation policy is particu-
larly significant in the context of antitrust standing, for detection of
illegal anticompetitive activities frequently occurs only after they have
been underway for a number of years.' 72 At this point a plaintiff is
most in need of reparation for injuries already suffered; neither the
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 320 (1962) ("Congressional concern was
with the protection of competition, not competitors") (emphasis in original) with id. at
344 ("we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses"). In particular, the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970), was intended to prohibit practices perceived as
harmful to small businesses even though the practices might not be systemically anti-
competitive. See C. EDWARDS, THE PICE DiSCRiIINATION LAW 13 (1959) (Act passed "to
cope with price discrimination that had significant effects on business opportunities,
whether or not these effects changed the vigor of market competition or increased the
probability of monopoly").
170. See, e.g., 21 CONG. R c. 2457 (1890) (Sen. Sherman); id. at 2558 (Sen. Pugh); In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) fT 61,434
(D.D.C. 1977) (rejecting argument that individual, noncommercial consumers lack injury
to "business or property" under § 4); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(1977-1 Trade Cas.) IT 61,360 (D. Minn. 1977) (consumer has suffered injury to "business
or property" when overcharged on retail item). But see Weinberg v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,250 (N.D. Cal. 1977), ap-
peal docketed, No. 77-1547 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1977) (denying consumer § 4 standing for
lack of injury to "business or property"). See generally M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE
CONSUMER 406-07 (1956).
Congress seemed to assume a consumer right to recover under § 4 during its considera-
tion of the Antitrust Improvements Act. See HousE REPORT, supra note 165, at 3-8. Con-
gress's interpretation of § 4 in this regard may not, however, be definitive. See Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611, 4614-15 n.14 (U.S. June 9, 1977); note 211 infra.
171. The monopsonistic power of the trusts to control wages and prices was noted
during the congressional debates in 1890. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456, 2457 (1890) (Sen. Sher-
man). Courts have granted § 4 standing to suppliers of goods, see, e.g., Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948), and to suppliers
of labor, see, e.g., Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976).
The antitrust exemption of labor unions, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), has been interpreted not
to bar suits by employees complaining of antitrust injuries by their employers. See
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cordova
v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
172. Former Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker recently remarked that the de-
tection rate of antitrust violations is much lower than that of other crimes because an
antitrust violation "is usually a concealed crime and there is rarely an identifiable victim
who is aware of the violation." Statement before the Tenth New England Antitrust Con-
ference, Nov. 20, 1976, reprinted in 790 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (1976).
Indeed, one of the objectives of the supporters of the Antitrust Improvements Act was
to strengthen the investigative authority of the Department of Justice in light of the
congressional finding that there was a "remote possibility of antitrust violators getting
caught" because of "the inadequacy of existing investigatory" capabilities. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 165, at 1. See id. at 10-12 (referring to Senate version of provisions eventually
enacted in substance and to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314).
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issuance of an injunction nor the imposition of criminal penalties
suffices. The damages remedy is especially appropriate where an in-
fusion of funds is essential to restore a plaintiff's competitive position
and thereby bolster a competitive market structure. 173 Even in the
absence of these special circumstances, however, consideration of the
compensation policy in standing determinations serves congressional
purposes as well as general remedial principles. 74
The importance of the deterrence policy of § 4 has been stressed
repeatedly by courts17 5 and commentators. 78 The status of the treble
damage award as "the principal existing sanction"' 77 among the anti-
trust penalties derives from both its impact and its availability. The
impact of a treble damage recovery exceeds that of the criminal penal-
ties normally imposed in government antitrust suits.' 78 Plaintiff re-
coveries in major private antitrust actions-including ones that have
been settled-generally far exceed the government's maximum criminal
fine.179 In practice, the criminal fines that are imposed tend to be
173. Damage awards might have served a competition-restoring function in such cases
as Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969) (independent gasoline distributor forced
to sell business to major oil company as result of antitrust violations that impaired his
competitiveness); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) (independent franchisor of soft drink bottlers allegedly driven
out of business by anticompetitive practices of major franchisors); and South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966) (milk producers allegedly forced to sell milk at "destructively low
prices" because of anticompetitive pricing policies of wholesaler and its chain of fran-
chised grocery stores).
174. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 297 F. 791, 802 (2d Cir. 1924) ("The constant tendency of the courts is to find
some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done.")
175. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136, 139 (1968); Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); Lehrman v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Monarch
Life Ins. Co. v. Regal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1963).
176. See, e.g., Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 211, 239 (1975); note 3 supra (citing commentators).
177. DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Ex-
perience (1), 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 1023, 1025.
178. The superior impact of the treble damage remedy is partly a function of its cor-
relation, albeit inexact, with the amount of profits derived from the antitrust violation
giving rise to the private action. The statutory limitations on criminal fines, see note
179 infra, restrict government penalties without regard to the profits the prosecuted
antitrust violator has reaped.
179. The maximum criminal fine was recently raised from 550,000 for all persons to
$1 million for corporations and $100,000 for all other statutory persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(Supp. V 1975). Plaintiff treble damage recoveries in private suits have frequently far
exceeded these limits. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
323-25 (1971) ($19.million judgment); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 644, 650
(1969) (remanding for reinstatement of award of $1.3 million); Armco Steel Corp. v.
North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 207'08 (8th Cir. 1967) (affirming recovery of $775,000). Re-
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quite low;' 8 0 indeed, they are sufficiently low to be absorbed easily by
the convicted corporation (or by the insured corporate executive).','
Finally, the deterrent effect of imprisonment for antitrust offenders is
undermined by the shortness of the sentences and the infrequency of
their imposition.8 2
The availability of the treble damage award as a supplement to
government suits also enhances the effectiveness of antitrust deter-
rence. Because of budgetary considerations, the government must
concentrate its resources on a few antitrust cases each year, and it
must seek consent decrees rather than penalties in nearly all other
cases.'8 3 In contrast, the prospect of treble damages encourages private
parties to bring some of the suits not brought by the government.
Moreover, consent decrees are often the precursor of private suits, 8 4
coveries in settled suits are comparably large. E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving $;10 million settlement in class action); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077,
1079-80 (E.D. Pa. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (separate
class recoveries of $1 million, $2 million, $1.75 million, and $26 million); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ($22 million
class recovery).
180. See Baker & Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 623
(1977) (fines actually imposed for antitrust violations over the past five years "were little
more than license fees when compared with the benefits realizable from price fixing").
181. See Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 631 & n.3
(1977).
182. See Baker 8: Reeves, supra note 180, at 623 n.16 ("No one convicted of antitrust
violations received prison sentences during fiscal 1962-1968 . . . . From 1969 to the
present, fewer than a dozen individuals have received prison sentences of more than 30
days.") (citing Antitrust Division data); 805 ANTITRUST & TRADE RaG. REP. (BNA) A-21,
A-22 (1977) (quoting Justice Department brief in support of motion to dismiss antitrust
indictment in light of nolo contendere plea: "'[O]ne day of incarceration constitutes
more time in jail than served by the vast majority of persons actually convicted of anti-
trust violations.'" (emphasis in original)). Conflicting views on the effectiveness of im-
prisonment as a general deterrent to antitrust violators were aired in a recent symposium,
Reflections on White-Collar Sentencing, 86 YALE L.J. 589 (1977).
In practice, the Justice Department restricts its criminal prosecutions to those anti-
competitive practices that are per se offenses or are otherwise willful or knowing vio-
lations. Baker & Reeves, supra note 180, at 623-24. As a result, treble damage actions are
the chief deterrent of most rule-of-reason offenses. Treble damage actions avoid the un-
fairness of subjecting defendants to criminal liability for acts whose illegality may have
been uncertain at the time of commission. At the same time, treble damage actions en-
courage the development of new theories of liability, and thereby lay the foundation for
more effective government enforcement. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964) (§ 4 suit in which Supreme Court held for first time that resale price maintenance
through "consignment" agreements violated antitrust laws). See Comment, supra note
3, at 1061.
183. In fiscal 1962-1974, an average of 68.7% of the civil suits instituted and even-
tually terminated by the Justice Department were settled by the entry of consent decrees.
Handler, supra note 176, at 240 n.149 (citing Antitrust Division data). In fiscal 1962-1972,
an average of 73.8% of the criminal prosecutions instituted and eventually terminated
by the Justice Department were concluded by the acceptance of nolo contendere pleas.
Id. at 247 n.177 (citing Antitrust Division data).
184. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, H. GOLDScHMIDT & R. PrroFsKY, supra note 3, at 164.
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suggesting that the treble damage award may be the most effective
and available enforcement mechanism even when the government does
take the initiative. Finally, criminal sanctions are inapplicable to sever-
al classes of antitrust offenses for which treble damages are awarded.' s8
Thus, the deterrence policy promoted by § 4 should be a primary
consideration in a court's antitrust standing inquiry.
The positive policies of compensation and deterrence are not the
only policies that courts should-or do-take into account in § 4 stand-
ing determinations. Not infrequently, courts deny standing because
the recoveries sought are deemed duplicative, 80  ruinous,8 7 "wind-
fall,"' 8  or speculative.'8 9 Less explicitly, courts may also take into
account the administrative costs that typical antitrust cases impose
on the judicial system.' 90 Although these policies-hereinafter called
"countervailing policies"-are rarely articulated clearly by the courts,
some are relevant policies for standing determinations and therefore
warrant examination.
The policy against duplicative recoveries derives from the traditional
legal rule against recovery more than once for the same injury, a
rule magnified in importance in the antitrust context because double
liability for treble damages might oblige the defendant to pay six-fold
damages.' 91 The policy comes into play in two types of cases: those
in which the plaintiff may recover damages in another, simultaneous
185. Conspiracies or combinations unreasonably to restrain trade and monopolization
or attempted monopolization can be punished by criminal sanctions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(Supp. V 1975), but violations in the form of unlawful price discrimination, exclusive
dealing, mergers, and interlocking directorates (except among common carriers) cannot,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18-20 (1970), unless they are part of a criminal antitrust violation.
186. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972); Donson Stores, Inc. v.
American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
187. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone En-
terprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
188. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
189. Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
190. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) [
61,360, at 71,268 (D. Minn. 1977) (referring briefly to standing as means of limiting case-
load). The relevance of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977),
to this concern is discussed infra at pp. 855-57. See Lytle & Purdue, supra note 10, at 801;
Sherman, supra note 10, at 403 (arguing that judicial administration interests militate
against broad standing grants).
191. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), af 'd per curiam sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); see Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries
Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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suit, and those in which multiple plaintiffs' injuries are so inseparable
that one plaintiff is likely to recover damages for injuries actually
suffered by another. An example of the first type is Pitchford v. PEPI,
Inc.,192 in which the court denied a shareholder standing, relegating
him to a corporate suit to repair the injury done to the business, and
thereby to the value of the shares. 193 An example of the second type is
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,'94 in which the Court denied Hawaii
standing to bring suit for injury to "the general economy" of the
state allegedly resulting from the defendants' anticompetitive activi-
ties. 9 G3 It reasoned that most of a recovery for injury to the state's
general economy would duplicate recoveries that individual con-
sumers and businesses might obtain under § 4.196
Avoidance of duplicative recoveries is a sound policy consideration,
but denial of standing is too blunt an instrument to promote this in-
terest sensitively. As Congress recently observed, courts have a num-
ber of ways, short of denying standing, by which to eliminate the
possibility that plaintiffs may enjoy multiple recoveries. 197 Usually
the problem can best be assessed-and resolved-after the litigants have
had the opportunity to present their case on the merits. 98
The policy against ruinous recoveries is related to, but distinguish-
able from, the policy against duplicative recoveries. The ruinous re-
coveries policy is pertinent when discrete injuries are so numerous
that nonduplicative treble damages recoveries for all of them would
heavily burden, or perhaps even bankrupt, one or more defendants. 99
This policy is usually referred to as a policy against "overkill" lia-
bility.200 It has so far been applied only to the potential cumulative
192. 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 US. 935 (1976).
193. Id. at 96-97.
194. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
195. Id. at 262-64.
196. Id.
197. SENATE REPORT, supra note 165, at 44-45 (explaining purpose of Antitrust Im-
provements Act provisions precluding duplicative liability; endorsing duplication avoid-
ance techniques described in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)). These alternative means of avoiding duplicative
recoveries are discussed infra at pp. 862-63.
198. See In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. f 74,680, at 94,978-79
(D. Conn. 1973).
199. Recovery for numerous discrete injuries, whether to many parties individually or
to a single party through repeated violations, may have a ruinous effect. In practice, the
problem has been raised only where many parties have been injured. In these cases courts
have used standing to bar certain plaintiffs from suing rather than releasing certain in-
dividual defendants from liability. E.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481
F.2d 122, 125, 129-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
200. E.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone
Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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effects of separate recoveries by "remotely" injured plaintiffs, though
it is theoretically applicable to a very large recovery by a single "di-
rectly" injured plaintiff. In contrast to the policy against duplicative
recoveries, whose concern is whether one injury results in multiple
recoveries, the policy against ruinous recoveries is concerned with the
total impact of a damage award, whether or not it is duplicative. The
two policies may reinforce each other in certain cases, but one may
be implicated without the other; for instance, duplication does not
necessarily result in overkill.
To date, courts have expressed a general but uncritical concern
about "overkill" in private antitrust suits.201 They apparently have
not recognized the relation of the ruinous recoveries policy to the
tenets of substantive antitrust law. Ruinous damages imposed on a
number of small competitors may significantly increase concentration
in an industry, to the detriment of consumers, suppliers, and other
beneficiaries of competitive markets.20 2 A court is justified in seeking
ways, including denial of standing, to mitigate these anticompetitive ef-
fects.2 03 In the absence of likely anticompetitive impact, however, con-
cern over the extent of an antitrust defendant's total liability repre-
sents no more than unwarranted solicitude for the alleged antitrust
violator. Accordingly, the ruinous recoveries policy should only carry
weight in standing determinations when long-term injuries to compe-
tition are demonstrably likely to result from the granting of standing
to a particular plaintiff.20 4
201. See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Commentators have also failed
to examine the scope and applicability of the overkill policy carefully. See, e.g., Sherman,
supra note 10, at 398-99.
202. To avoid such an effect, the Second Circuit recently approved on appeal a small
settlement with a nearly insolvent defendant, thereby permitting it to remain in the
market. Interview with H. Laddie Montague, Jr., counsel for plaintiff, In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, No. 76-7356 (2d Cir. filed Sept. 17, 1976), in Philadelphia (Apr. 4,
1977).
203. For a discussion of various means of avoiding "overkill" damages, see pp. 863-64
infra.
204. The Justice Department has taken a parallel approach to the ruinous recovery
problem in recommending penalties for antitrust violators. The Department has stated
that since every fine hurts the defendant somewhat, it will recognize the ruinous re-
covery defense only when the defendant meets the "heavy burden" of showing that a fine
"would effectively remove it from the market as a viable competitor." Antitrust Division
Memorandum on Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations in Felony Cases Under the
Sherman Act (Feb. 24, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal), excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W.
2419, 2420 (Mar. 8, 1977).
This standard finds further support in the legislative history of the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976. A principal purpose of the parens patriae provisions of the Act is
to prevent antitrust violators from being "unjustly enriched" by their antitrust violations.
See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 165, at 3. Opponents of the Act objected to these
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The policy against windfall recoveries is in part an outgrowth of
the duplicative recoveries policy, for those receiving multiple recov-
eries for a single injury are properly regarded as recipients of wind-
falls. 2°; But some lower federal courts have suggested another meaning
of windfall recovery in the antitrust standing context-a meaning fun-
damentally different from the traditional meaning of recovery for in-
jury that is already compensated or never took place. Although never
clearly articulated, this conception of windfall recovery appears to be
that plaintiffs with injuries that are discrete and provable, but too
incidentally caused, simply are not entitled to recover under § 4.206
At times the courts ascribe to Congress this conception of windfall
recovery. Congress, it is said, could not have intended that the supra-
compensatory sums authorized under a treble damages scheme be
awarded to "remotely" injured plaintiffs; therefore, recoveries by such
plaintiffs are windfalls.2 0 7 At other times, the courts holding this view
seem to reason that "strangers" to a commercial relationship 208 would
be recipients of windfalls if awarded treble damages, because only
parties in a "direct" commercial relationship with the defendant have
a legitimate expectation of protection from the defendant's antitrust
violation.2 09
provisions as threatening business with "ruinous liability" and proposed limiting liability
to single damages. An amendment to this effect was rejected in committee. See, e.g.,
SENATE REPORT, supra note 165, at 45. The committee also rejected arguments equating
any liability with ruinous liability, noting the similarity of these arguments to those pro-
pounded in opposition to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890:
"Many suggestions were made in argument based upon the thought that the Anti-
Trust Act would in the end prove to be mischievous in its consequences. Disaster
to business and wide-spread financial ruin, it has been intimated, will follow the
execution of its provisions. Such predictions were made in all the cases heretofore
arising under that act. But they have not been verified. It is the history of monopolies
in this country and in England that predictions of ruin are habitually made by them
when it is attempted, by legislation, to restrain their operations and to protect the
public against their exactions."
Id. at 7 (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351 (1904)).
205. Cf. Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (barring
recovery by stockholder for injury to the corporation without a showing of special injury
to the individual because of fear of duplicative recovery).
206. See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
207. See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). In Calderone, the court
attributed to Congress the view that treble damages would be a windfall to "remotely"
injured plaintiffs, without any citation to the legislative history. Id. at 1296. For an in-
dication of Congress's actual intent, see pp. 845-46 supra.
208. P. ARr.DA, supra note 3, at 72.
209. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394-95 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) (supplier is "too remote" to recover when anti-
trust violation was directed at supplier's customer); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
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Neither of these lines of reasoning supports a distinct conception
of windfall in the antitrust context. As the earlier review of the legis-
lative history of § 4 indicated,210 Congress in 1890 and in 1914 seemed
primarily interested in permitting all beneficiaries of the competitive
market system to bring private suits for treble damages. Recent con-
gressional pronouncements should put to rest any doubts about the
present intentions of Congress in this regard. 211 Similarly, the view
that treble damages are a windfall for "remotely" injured plaintiffs
because their injury is unforeseeable is not a tenable basis for denying
standing. Section 4 is a remedial statute21 2 designed to compensate
victims of illegal acts that are inherently intentional rather than negli-
gent. General principles of tort law thus suggest that the foreseeability
aspect of the windfall policy is irrelevant to antitrust standing.2 13
Therefore, except insofar as the windfall recoveries policy is synon-
ymous with the duplicative recoveries policy, it should have no impact
on antitrust standing determinations. And, insofar as it is synonymous,
it offers no independent ground for denying standing.
The policy against speculative recoveries has been mentioned only
occasionally as militating against grants of antitrust standing.21 4 If
considered properly, the policy should play no part whatsoever in the
standing inquiry. To deny standing on grounds of speculative injury
is to prejudge the merits of the plaintiff's claim for damages, for specu-
lativeness of injury implies inability to prove that injury exists. But
issues of adequacy of proof are ordinarily handled through motions
for summary judgment or for directed verdict.211 An antitrust plaintiff
210. See pp. 845-46 supra.
211. "Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, any person, including any consumer, who
can prove he was injured by price-fixing or any other antitrust violation, has a cause
of action." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 165, at 6. See note 165 supra (citing Senate Report).
But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611, 4614 n.14 (U.S. June 9, 1977)
(barring indirect purchasers from bringing actions under § 4 despite congressional sup-
port for such actions reflected in legislative history of Antitrust Improvements Act: Act
"did not alter the definition of which overcharged persons were injured within the
meaning of § 4").
212. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690, 696 (1977).
213. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 32-34 (transferred intent rule: if defendant acts
with intent to injure another, he is liable for unforeseen injury to third parties).
214. See, e.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff
61,360, at 71,268 (D. Minn. 1977); Al Barnett & Son v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D.
43, 53 (D. Del. 1974); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, 376 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
215. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), 50(a). Rule 41(b) provides for a motion for dismissal
at the close of the plaintiff's presentation of evidence in a non-jury trial. Rule 50(a) pro-
vides for a similar motion in a jury trial. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 2371, 2524 (1971) (citing cases).
Pre-trial summary judgment is available when it appears that a plaintiff will be unable
to produce credible evidence of injury. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(e). See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
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should not be denied an opportunity to present all its evidence on
causation and extent of injury before the court rules on whether its
allegations are sufficient as a matter of law; indeed, such a denial is
contrary to accepted notions of civil procedure. 216 Because the prob-
lem of speculative recoveries is irrelevant to the legal issue of which
parties may bring an antitrust claim to trial, it will not be considered
further. in this formulation of a policy approach to standing.2 17
The most difficult countervailing policy to evaluate is that against
burdening the courts with typically long and complex antitrust liti-
gation. This policy is likely to receive greater attention in light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Brick, which stressed the dif-
ficulties of proving passing-on of overcharges in the course of holding
that indirect purchasers could not recover treble damages under § 4.21s
Nevertheless, the implications of Illinois Brick for standing determi-
nations are far from clear. The Court noted that it was not reaching its
result on standing grounds.219 Moreover, chain-of-distribution cases
presented special problems of proof, because in suits involving several
levels in the chain all but ultimate purchasers had to establish not
only their payment of supra-competitive prices but also their failure
to pass-on the overcharges.
Illinois Brick thus does not foreclose the question whether judicial
burdens, at least outside chain-of-distribution cases, might be eased as
supra § 2712, at 370-84 (1973) (summary judgment is procedural device intended to weed
out unfounded claims). Compare Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1324-
25 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922
(1973) (conclusory affidavits alleging conspiracy to refuse to deal insufficient to raise
genuine issue of fact) with Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (where plaintiff produces affidavits establishing genuine issue of fact about
existence of damages, summary judgment cannot be granted on ground that extent of
damages is speculative).
216. Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts ... which would entitle him to relief"). A standing barrier based on po-
tential speculativeness of injury would conflict with the Supreme Court's liberal view
of the quantum of evidence needed to go to the jury on questions of injury and damages.
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969); Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931).
217. It should be noted that even if speculative recoveries were relevant to the stand-
ing inquiry, the categorization and target area approaches would be inadequate. Some
courts have supposed that direct injury tests provide a "fair and easily identifiable cutoff
point where dangers move from the ascertainable to the speculative." Plum Tree, Inc.
v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1972). To the contrary, neither approach pro-
vides a reliable means of determining whether damages are too speculative to warrant
recovery; either may eliminate some plaintiffs with ascertainable damages and retain
others with speculative ones. Cf. P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 75 (recognizing that some
plaintiffs barred by the direct injury doctrine have injuries not "unduly speculative").
218. )Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611, 4614, 4615-16 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
219. Id. at 4613 n.7.
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well by expanding the scope of antitrust standing as by narrowing it.
Remarking on the liberalization of standing outside the antitrust con-
text, Professor Davis has argued that "opening the doors to anyone
'injured in fact' will not appreciably increase the number of parties
who seek to litigate. It will cause an enormous drop in the huge
volume of litigation in the federal courts about the complexities of
the law of standing.' 2 2 0 The same might hold true in the context of
antitrust standing: liberalization might simply shift the existing ju-
dicial workload from decisions on standing to decisions on the merits.
Even if the judicial burdens policy could be conclusively identified
as militating against grants of standing, analysis reflecting this policy
would remain problematical. Neither the legislative history of § 4
nor judicial opinions in § 4 cases suggest how much weight should
attach to this policy.2 21 The Illinois Brick decision, for example,
though informed by a concern for adjudicatory problems in chain-of-
distribution cases, seemed to view these problems more as burdens
on plaintiffs than as burdens on courts.2 22 Furthermore, the Court in
220. Davis, supra note 11, at 471.
221. The framers of the Sherman and Clayton Acts evidently did not foresee that their
statutes would engender problems of judicial administration. If anything, they were
concerned that the Sherman Act would not adequately promote the bringing of suits by
private plaintiffs. See, e.g., 21 CONO. Rac. 2569 (1890) (Sen. Sherman); id. at 2571 (Sen.
Hiscock); id. at 3146 (Sen. Reagan). The collateral estoppel provisions of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), were enacted in large part to enhance private participation
in antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 9090 (1914) (Rep. Mitchell) ("travesty"
that victims of government-proven monopolization unable to maintain own suits).
Full discussion of the problem of judicial administration of antitrust litigation is no-
tably absent from court opinions in § 4 standing cases. For a rare passing reference, see
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 5 TRADE Ra. REP. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,360, at
71,268 (D. Minn. 1977) (§ 4 standing limitation "necessary to keep the caseload and the
fact situations of the cases within manageable bounds"). (The Supreme Court's ambiguous
comments about judicial administration in Illinois Brick are discussed infra at note 222.)
The lack of discussion does not mean that courts are unaware of the problem of judi-
cial administration; indeed, most defendants in § 4 suits make pointed references to
burdensome litigation in their briefs. E.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 17, Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(1977-1 Trade Cas.) ff 61,250 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1547 (9th Cir. Jan.
26, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (allowing consumer class actions would "present
enormous administrative problems for the courts"); Memorandum in Support of Mobil's
Motion to Dismiss at 5, Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 405 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(on file with Yale Law Journal) (allowing suit would "set in motion the costly and time
consuming processes of complex litigation").
222. Illinois Brick stated that Hanover Shoe's rejection of the pass-on defense was
grounded in concern for the "costs to the judicial system" incurred in attempts to
"reconstruct [price and output] decisions in the courtroom." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4614. Yet
in setting forth its own rationale for barring offensive use of pass-on arguments, the
Illinois Brick Court seemed to shift its emphasis to the costs that complex antitrust liti-
gation imposes on plaintiffs. If offensive pass-on arguments were permitted, the Court
reasoned, the consequent multiplicity of indirect purchasers litigating and sharing in
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Illinois Brick, by holding that the entire category of indirect pur-
chasers could not recover treble damages under § 4, sidestepped a fun-
damental dilemma facing courts that must apply the judicial burdens
policy in areas where neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has set
absolute rules. If courts under these circumstances are to apply the
policy to case-by-case standing determinations, they must assess how
a given quantum of judicial resources should be rationed among the
substantive claims of the various plaintiffs appearing before them.
Understandably, the Supreme Court itself has expressed reluctance to
engage in the claim-ranking that would necessarily underlie such
resource allocation decisions.2 23
The allocation of judicial resources is more properly a matter of
legislative competence and prerogative. Although Congress has not ex-
pressly confronted these issues in the context of private antitrust liti-
gation, it has recently stressed the importance of such litigation in de-
terring potential antitrust violators and compensating the victims of
antitrust violations.224 Since Congress's pronouncements came at a
time when the burdens borne by the courts were well publicized,225
one might infer that Congress did not consider those burdens to be a
significant countervailing policy. In any event, given the inequities
and impracticalities of balancing substantive claims against adminis-
trative costs, courts would be well advised to avoid using standing
determinations as cost-cutting devices. In another context, the Su-
preme Court has remarked that the adoption of straightforward rules
antitrust claims, as well as the evidentiary obstacles facing direct purchasers seeking to
disprove passing-on, might discourage direct purchasers from bringing § 4 suits at all.
Id. at 4617-18. This in turn would "undermine [the] effectiveness" of treble damage ac-
tions as an "important weapon of antitrust enforcement." Id. at 4615, 4618. Thus the
Court's reasoning forced it into the anomalous position of drastically reducing the
number of potential antitrust plaintiffs in order to promote deterrence of antitrust vio-
lations. In the process, unfortunately, the Court left unclear how the policy against
burdening the judicial system is related, if at all, to fostering deterrence and what
weight the former should be given in its own right. Other aspects of the Illinois Brick
opinion are examined infra at pp. 872-78.
223. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (if
courts were to determine which parties in which suits should be awarded attorneys' fees
for acting as private attorneys general, courts would have "to pick and choose among
plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue and to award fees in some cases but
not in others, depending upon the courts' assessment of the importance of the public
policies involved in particular cases").
224. See note 165 supra (citing congressional documents concerning Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976).
225. Perhaps the most salient proponent of congressional action to ease judicial work-
loads has been Chief Justice Burger. See Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report,
62 A.B.A.J. 189, 190 (1976) ("judges can do nothing [but] wait on Congress and urge
prompt action"); Chief Justice Burger Calls for Action on Several Proposals, 61 A.B.A.J.
303, 304 (1975) (reviewing various means of solving "the dilemma of an ever-increasing
[judicial] workload").
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of decision would alleviate the difficulties of deciding antitrust cases. 220
Analogously, the rules proposed in the next section may facilitate
standing determinations and might reduce the judicial burdens as-
sociated with typical antitrust cases.2 2 7
B. A Framework of Rules for Implementation and Accommodation
The preceding discussion of positive and countervailing policies
lays the groundwork for the proposed analytical framework. The next
step is to articulate rules for implementing these policies in standing
226. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (referring
to § 7 of Clayton Act: "in any case in which it is possible, without doing violence to
the congressional objective . . . . to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to
do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial administration").
227. There is one additional source of countervailing policies that should be noted.
In some cases an otherwise suitable antitrust claimant may be denied standing because
of a conflict between § 4 and another legal regime, be it derived from equity, common
law, or statutory law. For example, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the equitable doctrine
of in pari delicto was frequently invoked to deny standing to plaintiffs that participated
in the defendant's antitrust violation (e.g., through acceptance of franchise restraints).
Thus, in a case where an anticompetitive course of conduct had injured several persons,
some of the victims might have been denied standing to sue under § 4 because of the
conflict between the literal statutory provision affording standing to "[a]ny person . . .
injured" and the body of traditional equitable principles. (Since the Perma Life decision
disapproving the in pari delicto defense in most antitrust cases, the doctrine has been
applied more sparingly. See, e.g., Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 279 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. May 31, 1977) (in pari delicto defense un-
available where plaintiff's participation 'vas not essential to formation of illegal con-
spiracy).)
Similarly, if a corporation that has been found liable for treble damages in a § 4
suit were to bring a treble damage action derivatively against its management, alleging
that the losses incurred by the corporation represented injuries to business or property
"by reason of" acts by the management that are prohibited by the antitrust laws, the
managers would find themselves facing a claim for nine times the damage caused by
the antitrust violation they committed. See Blake, supra note 17, at 157-58 n.63. A court
would almost certainly deny standing to the plaintiff in such a case, and properly so
given the importance in corporate law of the delicate balance between fiduciary duty
and managerial discretion. Cf. Langsam v. Beam, 1975-2 Trade Cas. jr 60,552, at 67,419-20
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that corporation has no cause of action under § 4 to recover
from management amount of treble damages paid by corporation; § 4 does not "regu-
late the relation between a company and its management").
A final illustration of this type of countervailing policy can be drawn from In rc
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973), in which several plaintiffs sued the major automobile manufacturers for con-
spiring to forestall development of air pollution control devices. If the court in this case
had determined that awarding treble damages would impose such losses on the manu-
facturers that they would be likely to reduce their research and development expendi-
tures, it might have decided to mitigate the defendants' liability by denying standing to
one or more plaintiffs. Such a denial of standing would avoid a conflict between § 4 and
the environmental statutes' promotion of pollution control.
Of course, § 4 may be complementary to other legal regimes in certain situations. In
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, for example, an award of treble damages might
have furthered environmental as well as antitrust policies in the absence of adverse re-
search and development effects on the defendants.
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decisions and, in particular, for accommodating to the greatest extent
possible pertinent policies that are in genuine conflict.228
Application of these rules presupposes that the plaintiff's allega-
tions, if proven, would invoke the protection of the antitrust laws
in his favor. This presupposition is warranted for standing purposes
because the breadth of the compensation policy assures that it will
be implicated by virtually any injury causally linked to an antitrust
violation.229 Therefore, as long as the plaintiff alleges injury flowing
from defendant's anticompetitive acts, it is appropriate to assume, as
in the traditional direct injury inquiry, the applicability of the sub-
stantive law. Of course, the assumption that the plaintiff is within
the substantive protection of the antitrust laws for purposes of stand-
ing does not determine whether he is entitled to antitrust protection
on the merits; that question is decided only after appropriate devel-
opment of the legal and factual bases of the claim being presented. 230
But since injury in fact generally invokes the compensation principle,
substantive antitrust policy should not be injected into the standing
inquiry.
228. The case-by-case approach suggested here for applying the positive and counter-
vailing policies implicit in § 4 parallels that adopted in the rule-of-reason cases for
determining whether restraints of trade violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(Supp. V 1975). In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61 (1933),
for example, the Court noted that in applying § 1 "a close and objective scrutiny of
particular conditions and purposes is necessary in each case. Realities must dominate
the judgment .... The question of the application of the statute is one of intent and
effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary assumptions." By its explicit attention
to the policies implicated by § 4, the suggested approach also responds to Judge Learned
Hand's celebrated injunction to "remember that statutes always have some purpose or
object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide
to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), af! 'd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945).
229. The one court that has considered at length the distinction between the threshold
question of standing and the ultimate resolution of the merits has concluded that allega-
tions bringing plaintiff "'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected'" by the
antitrust laws were sufficient to state a claim of substantive protection for standing
purposes. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1152 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
For a broad formulation of the scope of antitrust protection afforded by § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), for purposes of standing, see Cromar Co. v.
Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 509 (3d Cir. 1976) (any "producer-
participant" in industry allegedly sought to be monopolized has standing under § 2 of
Sherman Act).
230. The question of protection on the merits ordinarily cannot be decided on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FFD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), due to the
covertness and complexity of many antitrust offenses, discovery is usually necessary to
develop fully the facts establishing a violation against which the plaintiff is protected.
Hence, a decision on the merits can rarely be made before summary judgment is ap-
propriate under FED. R. Civ. P. 56, and often must await trial. Cf. Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (summary judgment procedures "should
be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles").
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Rule 1: Where no countervailing policy against a particular plain-
tiffs antitrust action is implicated, the court should grant standing
no matter how "remote" the alleged injury. This rule essentially pro-
vides that standing to obtain private antitrust relief shall, wherever
possible, be coextensive with the substantive protection of the anti-
trust laws.231 A principal basis for the rule is the compensation policy,
which by itself is equally compelling whether injury is "direct" or
"remote," and whether the victim is inside or outside a "target area."
The deterrence policy also strongly supports this rule. Denial of stand-
ing in the absence of countervailing policies would undermine the
deterrent effect of private actions.
Rule 1 typically would apply in cases where only one or a few
parties have sustained injuries and sued.232 In such cases, there is vir-
tually no possibility that the policy against ruinous recoveries will
be implicated, because "overkill" normally results only when nu-
merous plaintiffs recover.2 33 Similarly, there is only a slight possibility
of duplicative recoveries and, therefore, windfalls, where only one or
a few injured parties sue.234 Hence, in these cases, a court following
the proposed approach would ascertain whether any countervailing
policies applied and, in the likely event that none did, it would grant
antitrust standing under Rule 1.235
Rule 2: Where there is a potential conflict between the positive and
231. The rule's broad conception of standing complements the Supreme Court's will-
ingness to interpret various substantive provisions of the antitrust laws in the spirit of
the procompetitive purposes for which Congress enacted them. See Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1969); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 348-52 (1968).
Cf. D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174 (1915) (dictum)
("founded upon broad conceptions of public policy, . . . not only the prohibition of the
[Sherman Act] but the remedies which it provided [are] co-extensive with such concep-
tions").
232. Rule 1, for example, would call for a different result in Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1970), where a sole plaintiff
was denied standing. This case is discussed further infra at pp. 879-80.
233. See note 199 supra.
234. Even a single-party suit, of course, may be duplicative if it ultimately develops
that the relief being sought is for injury suffered by another person. In such a case the
proper procedure is a directed verdict at trial for failure to prove injury. If a single-party
plaintiff does prove injury, his recovery would represent a windfall only if his injury
could not be distinguished from that suffered by others and, therefore, his damages could
not be apportioned fairly. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972)
(since § 4 permits state to sue in proprietary capacity and its citizens to sue for injury
to business or property, to permit state to recover damages for injury to its general
economy "would open the door to duplicative recoveries").
235. Because overkill possibilities often become apparent only when liability is deter-
mined at trial, it sometimes may be necessary to defer standing determinations to the
trial stage of antitrust litigation, rather than make them during the pre-trial stage as is
commonly done. For examples of cases in which the standing determination has been
deferred to trial, see Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); and Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the countervailing policies, the court should investigate the factual
circumstances of the case to determine whether there is a genuine
conflict between them. If there is no genuine conflict, then Rule 1
applies: standing should be coextensive with the substantive protec-
tion of the antitrust laws. This rule reflects the desirability of re-
solving standing issues with minimum infringement of the values
embodied in each of the pertinent policies, whether positive or coun-
tervailing. The rule calls for eschewing unnecessary balancing of
strong policies in areas of false conflict.236 When the facts of a case
do not create genuine conflict among the pertinent policies, then in-
jury in fact should confer standing under the compensation policy.
Rule 2 would frequently be applicable where the policies against
overkill and duplicative recoveries appear to be relevant. If, for ex-
ample, a private antitrust defendant asserts that a particular plaintiff's
claims would result in ruinous recoveries (presumably, in conjunction
with all other suits then pending or possible), the court should inquire
whether the defendant can establish that his diminished ability to
compete would represent an injury to the relevant market's competi-
tive structure. There is no genuine conflict between the two positive
policies of § 4 and the overkill policy if a defendant cannot make this
showing of injury to competition. Such a showing would be particu-
larly unlikely where several major injured parties are barred from
suit by the statute of limitations..2 3 7
Similarly, in suits by "incidentally" injured plaintiffs, the policy
against windfall recoveries does not conflict with the compensation
and deterrence policies unless there is a potertitll duplicative re-
covery by a single plaintiff. As was argued earlier,- only a plaintiff who
has suffered no injury receives a windfall by treble damage recovery.
Thus, in this example, as in the previous one, the lack of genuine
conflict between the countervailing policies against overkill and dupli-
cative recovery, and the positive policies favoring compensation and
236. The approach advocated here has a parallel in conflict-of-laws analysis. Where
the policies of one jurisdiction seem to conflict with those of another, courts tend to
scrutinize the policies to ensure that full realization of the first jurisdiction's policies is
not sacrificed unless the second jurisdiction's policies are actually implicated. See A. VON
MIEHREN & D. TAUTMAN, THE LAW OF NIULTISTATE PROBLEMS 327-40 (1965); Currie, Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKr L.J. 171, 178.
237. The statute of limitations in ordinary private antitrust litigation is four years.
15 U.S.C.A. § 15b (West Supp. 1977). In private lawsuits based on government actions,
the limitations period is one year from the date of termination of the government action
if the government action is terminated more than four years after the private cause of
action accrued. Id. § 16(i). At least one court has noted the effectiveness of the statute
of limitations in disposing of potential duplication problems. See Boshes v. General
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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deterrence would result in the application of Rule 1 and a grant of
standing.
Rule 3: In cases of genuine conflict between positive and counter-
vailing policies, the court should explore all available techniques for
eliminating the conflict. This rule encourages courts to canvass pro-
cedural alternatives short of a denial of standing in order to reconcile
the conflicting policies. This process ensures that all the relevant
standing policies will be vindicated to the fullest extent possible.
Rule 3 is particularly pertinent to suits implicating the policies
against duplicative and windfall recoveries. The courts can employ a
host of techniques to prevent a private damage claim from leading
to recovery for someone else's injury or for injury already compensated.
Where parties at different levels in a chain of distribution sue the
same defendant, fears of duplicative or windfall recoveries may be
allayed at times by apportionment of damages at trial. 238 Where only
one of several injured parties in a chain of distribution has filed suit
and others in the wings are not barred by the statute of limitations,
a variety of procedural devices may be used in particular cases to bring
in parties with duplicative claims and apportion damages among
them.239 In cases not involving chains of distribution, existing remedies
may help avoid duplicative recoveries. For example, the derivative suit
for antitrust damages suffered through corporate injury serves to block
238. Apportionment of damages to different levels of purchasers can be accomplished
in various ways. When the only purchasers suing are businesses, courts can use the so-
called "yardstick" technique of determining damages suffered. This technique compares
the plaintiffs' allegedly reduced profit levels with those of unaffected but otherwise
comparable firms in the same industry. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). An alternative technique, which is
essential where all businesses in an industry have been affected, compares pre- and post-
violation profit levels for each level of business purchasers. Pacific Coast Agr. Export
Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 959 (1976). Both of these techniques reveal how much of an alleged overcharge is
absorbed at each intermediate level in the chain of distribution, thereby preventing
duplication in different levels' recoveries.
If non-business levels, such as ultimate consumers, also sue, the yardstick and before-
and-after techniques remain useful. The damage suffered by ultimate consumers is at
least the amount of the initial overcharge that is not absorbed by intermediate levels
in the form of diminished profits. (The same techniques, applied to the defendants'
prices, can be employed to estimate the initial overcharge.) Ultimate consumers may have
suffered damages in excess of the unabsorbed portion of the initial overcharge if the
defendants or intermediate purchasers used a percentage mark-up pricing system, which
magnifies the overcharge at subsequent purchaser levels.
239. The majority in Illinois Brick broadly discounted the capacity of procedural
devices to overcome the possibility of duplication in chain-of-distribution recoveries. See
45 U.S.L.W. at 4614 n.11, 4615-16. The Court's generalizations seem unwarranted, how-
ever; a case-by-case analysis of the value of various procedures would seem preferable to
abandonment of them. See pp. 873-78 infra (discussing procedures for avoiding dupli-
cative recoveries in chain-of-distribution cases).
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separate recoveries by a corporation and its shareholders; it should
continue to be required in lieu of direct shareholder suits. 240
The problem of duplicative recoveries from consumer and parens
patriae antitrust suits has been virtually eliminated by the provisions
of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.241 The Act contemplates
the bringing of private consumer actions and state parens patriae ac-
tions for the same violations, 242 but it guards against consequent dupli-
cative recoveries in two ways. First, it bars private relitigation of all
§ 4 claims already adjudicated in a parens patriae suit.243 Second, the
Act excludes from recovery through parens patriae actions any dam-
ages already awarded to the injured parties in private suits. 244 Hence-
forth, courts entertaining private consumer actions can avoid conflicts
between positive and countervailing standing policies simply by de-
termining which claims have been foreclosed by prior parens patriae
litigation. They need not be concerned that future parens patriae liti-
gation will entail duplicative recoveries.
To the extent that ruinous liability in a given case is a function
of duplicative recoveries, the techniques already mentioned should
240. See pp. 813-15 supra (discussing early antitrust cases denying standing to share-
holders). Suits by closely held corporations and their officers may be thought to present
special duplication problems, for officers of such corporations are often the principal
or only shareholders and could recover the same damages twice if both they and their
alter ego corporations recover those profits that go to salaries. But if such officer-share-
holders are granted standing in their employee capacity, no problem of duplicative re-
coveries need arise. If the employees win the suit, their recovery for salaries they have
lost can simply be taken into account in computing (i.e., reducing) the corporation's lost
profits or diminished going-concern value. See Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers &
Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531
F.2d 92, 97, 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) (in computing corporate profit-
ability as basis for damage award, court required deduction of salary as cost of opera-
tions, but denied employee-shareholder standing as employee). Denial of standing to em-
ployee-shareholders in the former capacity not only results in a less than fully compen-
satory recovery for them but also makes their degree of compensation depend arbitrarily
on the portion of profits they elected not to withdraw as salary.
241. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15c-15h (%Vest Supp. 1977).
242. See id. § 15c. The Act in effect overrules the result in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), in which a state parens patriae suit was barred on the ground
that duplicative recoveries might result if private suits were also brought.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick barring indirect pur-
chaser suits, the viability of parens patriae actions brought on behalf of the many con-
sumers who are indirect purchasers is problematical. See 45 U.S.L.W. at 4614 n.14
(stating that parens patriae amendments to Clayton Act gave consumers no new substan-
tive rights under § 4). Parens patriae actions on behalf of consumers who are direct pur-
chasers would seem to survive the decision.
243. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(b)(3) (West Supp. 1977). Where state parens patriae suits
and private consumer suits are brought simultaneously, the Act avoids duplicative re-
coveries by allowing consumers to opt out of the parens patriae action, id. § 15c(b)(2),
and by making any adjudication in the parens patriae suit res judicata for any private
plaintiff who fails to opt out, id. § 15c(b)(3).
244. Id. § 15c(a)(1)(A).
863
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 809, 1977
mitigate that countervailing policy. Overkill problems not stemming
from duplication may also be ameliorated by procedural adjustments.
Some courts have employed installment payment plans to ease the
burden of substantial damage awards.24 Dismissal of the most
economically vulnerable defendants may be warranted, but only as a
penultimate resort.246 Although a drastic measure, it is preferable to
the alternative of denying standing to certain plaintiffs, for it serves the
policy against anticompetitive ruinous recoveries with less sacrifice of
compensation and deterrence objectives.2 47
Rule 4: Where a genuine conflict between positive and countervail-
ing policies cannot be mitigated, the court should make a standing
determination based on the policies' relative strength in light of the
facts before it. As this rule suggests, the countervailing policies on oc-
casion may require that the scope of antitrust standing be narrower
than the scope of substantive protection. For example, potential re-
coveries may be so large as to have a significant anticompetitive effect
on an industry, one that cannot be alleviated adequately through
either delayed payments or selective exemptions from liability. The
policies of compensation and deterrence should then be frustrated in
order to serve the overriding statutory purpose of preserving a com-
245. See Langsam v. Beam, 1975-2 Trade Cas. J 60,552, at 67,418 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (de-
scribing installment payment of $18 million treble damage award in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971)); Interview with Steven Goldman, ac-
countant for plaintiffs in charge of settlement in City of Philadelphia v. American Oil
Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971), in Philadelphia (Aug. 3, 1976) (stating that installment
payments had been negotiated in settlement of case). Cf. EEOC v. Steamfitters' Local
638, 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1186 (1977) (suggesting that if
total award for back pay in Title VII suit proved "too great for the union to pay," it
might be possible "either to modify the award on a pro rata basis or to provide for pay-
ments in installments," but reserving decision on question). Selective low settlements
with weak defendants are another means of overkill avoidance. See note 202 supra.
246. In some cases it may be desirable to delay standing determinations until trial,
so that the facts about the alleged overkill effect can be developed. See note 235 supra;
EEOC v. Steamfitters' Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
1186 (1977) (stating that overkill avoidance before relief stage would be "premature").
247. Excusing insolvent or nearly insolvent defendants on policy grounds would be
analogous to the "failing company" doctrine applied in cases decided under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). That doctrine has been held to justify mergers that
could normally be found illegal, on the theory that the anticompetitive effect of the
merger would probably be less than the anticompetitive effect of one company failing
entirely. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971) (setting
out "failing company" test). The "failing company" doctrine arguably finds support in
the "substantially to lessen competition" requirement for a § 7 violation; there is no
literal support for a failing defendant exception in the language of § 4. Nevertheless,
the firm establishment of the overkill policy in standing cases, see, e.g., Calderone En-
terprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), and the antitrust laws' concern for maintaining com-
petitive markets argue in fav6r of such an exception.
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petitive market structure. In such instances, the court should estimate
the damages of the plaintiffs and the highest nonruinous level of ag-
gregate recovery at a point in the litigation when an informed assess-
ment is possible. It should then dismiss the actions of a number of
otherwise suitable plaintiffs so that the total claim equals the non-
ruinous level ascertained. Since, for a given level of recovery, the
identity of the plaintiffs is critical for the compensation policy, and
not for the deterrence policy,248 the court should deny standing to
those plaintiffs whose injury is less severe. 249
Similarly, where duplicative recovery appears unavoidable in a
particular chain-of-distribution case because of the infeasibility of
such mitigating procedures as apportionment of damages, the court
should determine the nonduplicative aggregate level of liability and
deny standing to the less severely injured among the plaintiffs. If se-
verity of injury cannot be evaluated because of the complexity of the
facts, the court could deny standing to those plaintiffs least likely to
be able to substantiate their damage claims.2 50
The balance sometimes should be struck in favor of compensation
and deterrence in spite of an applicable countervailing policy. For
example, where the damage claim of a competitor, severely injured
by an antitrust violation, raises an unmitigable risk of overkill, the
court should grant the plaintiff standing nevertheless. If the competi-
tive strength of one of the firms in a market must be impaired, it
should be that of the antitrust perpetrator, not that of the antitrust
victim. A denial of standing in this situation would not only thwart
compensation for injuries but also encourage antitrust violators to
engage in practices that devastate their competitors.
In sum, an antitrust standing inquiry informed by the four rules
proposed in this Part is rooted in careful analysis of the policy con-
siderations implicated by the facts of the particular case. Only after
such analysis is it possible for a court to identify the policies relevant
to the standing determination and to assess the possibilities for ac-
commodating those policies that conflict.
248. As Justice Brennan noted in his Illinois Brick dissent, "from the deterrence
standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as some one redresses the
violation." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4621. Justice Brennan's observation was quoted with approval
by the majority. Id. at 4618.
249. Because the compensation policy responds to the severity of an injury, not its
directness, denial of standing to avoid duplicative recoveries should not be based on the
directness of the plaintiff's injury. See pp. 846-47 supra.
250. Courts should refrain from transforming particular denials of standing because
of difficulties of proof into standing barriers applicable to entire classes of antitrust
victims. Such policy decisions should be left to Congress. See p. 878 infra.
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IV. The Policy Approach Applied: A Typology
of Antitrust Standing Cases
The implications of the proposed framework for antitrust standing
can be elucidated by focusing on four classes of antitrust standing
cases, grouped for heuristic purposes only. Each class involves a
particular combination of standing policies and each presents un-
resolved and controversial standing issues. The discussion demonstrates
how the framework can help ensure more systematic standing deci-
sions in these classes of cases than has heretofore been the norm.
The four classes of cases may be called multiple effect cases, chain-
of-distribution cases, ripple effect cases, and merger cases. The first
class of cases involves illegal exercises of market power that result
in discrete anticompetitive effects in different markets in which the
violator buys or sells. The second class involves the transmission
("passing on") of the effects of illegal market power forward or back-
ward through chains of purchase or sale. The third involves injuries
arising from economic relations outside a chain of distribution that
typically appear to ripple outward from the initial impact of the
violation. Mergers, the fourth class of cases, do not fit neatly into any
one of the above classes but may involve some of the standing problems
of all three.
A. Multiple Effect Cases
Multiple effect cases typically arise from the exercise of very sub-
stantial amounts of market power. The exercise of this power may
be characterized as a single massive antitrust violation or as a complex
of several antitrust violations. In either view, the distinguishing mark
of these cases is that they are brought by parties that have suffered a
variety of discrete economic injuries as a result of the defendant's
anticompetitive conduct in several markets.
The famous Alcoa case2- 1 is illustrative. The defendant had attempt-
ed to monopolize the aluminum industry through various anticom-
petitive practices. In the early period of its activities, Alcoa entered
into cartel arrangements with foreign aluminum producers that lim-
ited aluminum imports into the United States;2- 2 it also developed
exclusive dealing contracts with power companies that denied poten-
tial competitors access to the large amounts of electric power required
251. United States v. Aluminum co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (L.
Hand, J.).
252. Id. at 422.
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in the production of aluminum.253 Meanwhile, the company devel-
oped a monopoly of aluminum production, which it maintained by
blocking entry through anticipatory increases in capacity254 and by
acquiring control of virtually all sources of bauxite, the ore from
which aluminum is made.2 5 Later, Alcoa integrated forward into
fabrication of finished aluminum products and through its mo-
nopolization of these products, squeezed non-integrated fabricators.2- 6
Thus, at the time of the government's lawsuit, Alcoa, in addition
to enjoying illegal monopoly power in the production of aluminum,
was found to be engaging in: (1) the destruction of potential com-
petitors (through its exclusive dealing contracts with power companies
and its other entry barriers); (2) the squeezing of non-integrated fab-
ricators (through manipulation of the price charged for finished
aluminum); and (3) monopolization of the retail market in fabricated
aluminum (through its power over the amount of independent fab-
rication).2 7 All three of these abuses flowed from the market power
Alcoa wielded by reason of its monopoly over aluminum production.
258
Alcoa's conduct typifies the way multiple violations in several markets
lead to multiple effects. Each violation affected different parties-
potential competitors, non-integrated fabricators, purchasers, and
others-in distinct ways. Under such circumstances, the proposed frame-
work would suggest that each of the injured parties has standing to
complain of the violation that injured him, despite the risk of ruinous
recoveries due to the number of plaintiffs. Otherwise, discrete injuries
to.competition in several different markets would go uncompensated in
situations-cases of massive monopolization-in which compensation to
the injured parties is likely to help restore competition.2 S9
Moreover, there is another reason for granting standing to all those
injured in an Alcoa situation. If standing were denied, extensions
of monopoly power over several markets, such as Alcoa's, would be
253. Id.
254. Id. at 430-31.
255. Cf. id. at 432-34 (discussing whether Alcoa's purchase of all available bauxite
supplies manifested anticompetitive intent).
256. Id. at 436-38. Fabricators were "squeezed" between the prices Alcoa charged for
the raw material (ingots) and the finished product (rolled sheets). Id. at 437.
257. The illegal import-restricting arrangements with foreign producers had pre-
sumably been terminated, pursuant to an earlier consent decree, at the time of the
monopolization suit. See id. at 422.
258. See id. at 431, 437, 438.
259. In Alcoa, compensation might have helped restore competition by strengthening
the squeezed independent fabricators and the excluded potential competitors in finished
aluminum production (if the latter could have proved damages). See Baush Mach. Tool
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1935) (remanding for retrial suit
brought by independent fabricators).
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deterred less effectively than concentrations of monopoly power in a
single market. A monopolist like Alcoa would be relatively secure
in pursuing exclusive dealing arrangements and other extensions of
market power, even though it would risk enormous treble damages
liability if it extracted all possible monopoly profit from its buyers
alone.2 n0
Of course, the risks of overkill are increased where multiple effects
engender many independent injuries. But an overkill defense cannot
be permitted to prevail in antitrust standing decisions when great mar-
ket power causes numerous simultaneous injuries, lest a defendant be
effectively shielded from liability because of the outrageous scope of
his own misconduct. Such a result would contradict both the deter-
rent and the compensatory purposes of the antitrust laws. Accordingly,
in multiple effect cases there is an especially compelling need to use
procedural devices to confine the overkill policy to its narrowest pos-
sible scope: that is, to emphasize deferred damage payments and
limited reductions in liability, in lieu of denying standing to par-
ticular plaintiffs.
Multiple effects can arise not only from attempts to monopolize
but also from conspiracies in restraint of trade. Anticompetitive ac-
tions taken by colluding oligopolists can, for example, have both mo-
nopolistic and monopsonistic effects simultaneously. The standing
problems this situation raises are illustrated in In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution.261 The defendant automobile manufacturers
had allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to suppress development and
installation of automobile air pollution control systems.202 This con-
spiracy allegedly included both an illegal joint refusal to deal with
independent makers of air pollution control devices263 and an illegal
restraint on competitive technological innovation. 264 Suit was brought
by the independent device makers for loss of profits, and by farmers
for crop damage due to the adverse environmental effects of unabated
automotive air pollution. The latter were held to lack standing on
260. The deterrence policy also argues against such disparities in § 4 enforcement be-
cause extensions of monopoly power may help to consolidate the monopoly in its original
market. Although there is debate over the efficacy of market extension practices in in-
creasing monopoly power, it is clear that they can be used effectively under some cir-
cumstances-as in the case of the Alcoa exclusive dealing contracts and independent
fabricator squeezes-to reduce competition outside the market that is the source of the
monopoly power. See RiEPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 146-47 (Gov't Printing Office 1955) (exclusive dealing).
261. 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
262. Id. at 124.
263. Id. at 129.
264. Id. at 129 n.10.
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the ground that the conspiracy had been directed only against the in-
dependent device makers and that the crop farmers were merely its
incidental victims. 0
Under the proposed framework for standing analysis, the indepen-
dent injury to competition worked by the conspiracy to suppress de-
velopment of pollution control devices would have warranted grants
of standing to the injured crop farmers. Independent liability for the
separate violation against the farmers would serve an important deter-
rent function. Conspiracies to suppress development of pollution con-
trol technology will not be deterred effectively unless forced to bear
the costs of the substantial environmental damage that results. Further-
more, compensation for each of the multiple effects would be un-
necessarily incomplete if the court denied the farmers standing with-
out exploring means of mitigating potential conflicts among anti-
trust policies. The danger of ruinous liability for certain of the defen-
dants in the Air Pollution case, for example, could have been averted
at trial by exemption of the weak defendants in the name of preserving
competition in the auto industry. This approach would have been far
less drastic than the denial of standing to the large class of allegedly
injured plaintiffs.
Multiple effect cases are especially susceptible to confusion of the
issues of antitrust standing and substantive protection. In a typical
multiple effect suit arising from, say, three separate antitrust viola-
tions, a plaintiff injured by one of the violations frequently alleges
injury as well from the other two. Often the antitrust laws do not pro-
tect him against these other violations. In such a case the court, though
correctly regarding the plaintiff as unable as a matter of substantive
law to assert the latter claims, errs by holding that the plaintiff was
not directly injured and therefore lacks standing to recover for those
injuries. The court then compounds its error by overlooking the vio-
lation that was properly the subject of the plaintiff's complaint. Thus,
the plaintiff's expansive pleadings and the court's misdirected analysis
conspire to deprive the antitrust victim of any recovery.
The seminal target area case of Conference of Studio Unions v.
Loew's Inc.2 60 exemplifies the multiple effect cases in which this prob-
lem has arisen. An association of labor unions and their members al-
leged a conspiracy between a cartel of movie producers and the actors'
unions that were the major suppliers of labor to the cartel's only com-
petitors, certain independent movie producers.2 67 The defendant car-
265. Id. at 129-30 & n.10.
266. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
267. Id. at 52-53.
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tel agreed to hire only the defendant unions' members in return for
the unions' promise not to deal with the independent producers or
to deal with them only on a discriminatory basis.268 In effect, each of
the co-conspirators harnessed the market power of the others in a
bilateral refusal to deal that produced substantial anticompetitive ef-
fects in the motion picture industry's labor market and product market.
The Ninth Circuit's view of the case was myopic. Overlooking the
bilateral character of the challenged practices, the court focused on
the role of the union-producer cartel in injuring the cartel's competi-
tors. In that light, the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover
under § 4 because it was the independent movie producers, not the
plaintiffs, that had suffered a cognizable injury.269 The opinion re-
flects confusion over standing and substantive protection: standing lan-
guage about incidental injury and endangered area is juxtaposed with
substantive language about stating a cause of action under the anti-
trust laws. 27 0 In the midst of the confusion, the court lost sight of the
other half of the conspiracy, the major movie producers' agreement
to deal exclusively with the defendant unions. Had the court realized
that the case involved two alleged violations it would, in the absence
of countervailing policies, have granted the plaintiffs standing and
faced the underlying substantive question which, in focusing on stand-
ing, it failed to consider: whether a labor agreement with anticompeti-
tive effects gives rise to an antitrust claim by employees boycotted by
the conspiring firm.271
268. Id.
269. Id. at 54. The court disposed of some claims by relying on Schatte v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950). 193 F.2d at 53-54.
In Schatte some of the individual and union plaintiffs in Studio Unions alleged that
the conspiracy between major movie producers and defendant unions violated the labor
laws and also gave rise to an antitrust violation by forcing the independent movie
producers to hire less efficient members of the defendant unions instead of the plaintiffs.
182 F.2d at 162-63. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the complaint on all counts. Id. at
167. The court held that the antitrust claim failed to state a cause of action under
the doctrine of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), that an antitrust vio-
lation must damage "'commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services.'"
182 F.2d at 167 (quoting Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 495). In Studio Unions the plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent the Sehatte decision by alleging, inter alia, that the conspiracy
resulted in an additional anticompetitive consequence: the boycott of plaintiff unions'
members by the major studios. 193 F.2d at 53 (cf. Schatte, 182 F.2d at 167 (no allegation
that boycott violated antitrust laws)).
270. 193 F.2d at 54.
271. Unless one of the countervailing policies was demonstrably implicated, plaintiffs
should also have had standing to sue had they alleged attenuated but provable employ-
ment effects of the defendant unions' boycott of the independents.
For other examples of cases in which the existence of several violations in the course
of one exercise of market power was confused with issues of antitrust standing, see Radio
Corp. of America v. SCM, Inc., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969);
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B. Chain-of-Distribution Cases
When price fixing or other restraints of trade occur in one stage of
a product's transformation from raw material to finished good or its
subsequent distribution as a finished good, the first party that pur-
chases from the antitrust violator may pass on to the party to which
it sells the higher costs created by the illegal overcharge; the latter
party may in turn do the same to its purchasers. Part or all of the
adverse effect of the initial party's anticompetitive conduct may thus
be transmitted down the chain of distribution. This passing-on process
frequently gives rise to suits against the antitrust violator by both
the first, or direct purchaser, and subsequent, or indirect, purchasers
that have been overcharged. These suits form a controversial class of
standing cases. Because of the multiplicity of parties affected by the
overcharge and the complexity of proving the extent to which supra-
and NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n, No. 77-Civil-881 (S.D.N.Y. filed May
13, 1977). In SCM, RCA, after finding no additional licensees for a copying process,
alleged that SCM had used its dominant position in the copying market both to forestall
entry by competitors and to attempt to coerce lower royalties to RCA. The court ruled
that only SCM's potential competitors, which of course had not sued, would have stand-
ing, and that RCA lacked standing as a non-competitor patentee. 407 F.2d at 168-71.
This ruling overlooked the plaintiff's allegation of not only "horizontal" m6nopolization
that was injuring competitors but also "vertical" monopolization that was monopsonis-
tically injuring a supplier. SCM is thus a case in which the same illegal acts of the
defendants constituted two independent violations, but were perceived as only one vio-
lation because of the blinders of the categorization approach. See id. at 172-73 (Timbers,
J., dissenting).
NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n was a class action for injunctive relief
under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), but it illustrates the § 4 standing
confusion because the court expressly adopted a § 4 standing analysis to determine
whether the plaintiffs could maintain their suit. Opinion at 7-9. The plaintiffs included
three women, one of whom was black, who had been denied employment or advance-
ment by several New York City banks. Id. at 1-3. The plaintiffs alleged that the banks
had conspired to use their monopoly power over "specialized financial or data processing
services" to force the city to abandon the affirmative action requirements it normally
imposed on city contractors. Id. at 2. The court denied the three women standing, in an
opinion that borrowed from both target area and categorization tests. The court held
that the alleged conspiracy was "aimed at" the city of New York, not at the present or
prospective employees of the defendants. Id. at 11. The area endangered by the vio-
lation, the court suggested, was commerce in financial services, and the plaintiffs were
"neither suppliers nor consumers" of those services. Id. The court also analogized the
plaintiffs to employees suing for antitrust damages to their employers; that category,
the court held, lacks antitrust standing. Id. at 12.
By viewing the banks' actions as a direct injury to the city and only an indirect one
to the plaintiffs, the court overlooked the possibility that an alleged conspiracy to avoid
hiring on the basis of race and sex could be characterized as a labor boycott in itself
violating the antitrust laws. Insofar as the plaintiffs' allegations were an attempt to
state a claim of injury from such a boycott, the court should have permitted the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint so that they could frame the substantive protection issues.
Instead, by disposing of the case on standing grounds, the court failed to confront the
underlying issues of antitrust protection and of Title vII's implied supersession of dis-
criminatory boycott claims made under the antitrust laws.
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competitive prices were passed-on, chain-of-distribution suits may pose
sharp conflicts between the positive policies of compensation and de-
terrence and the countervailing policies against duplicative and wind-
fall recoveries.272
The value of a policy approach to standing is precisely that it helps
identify and reconcile these conflicts. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has failed to take a policy approach to standing in the two land-
mark chain-of-distribution cases that have come before it. In Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,273 the Court barred anti-
trust violators from raising the defense that the plaintiff purchasers
had completely or partially passed-on their overcharges and therefore
had not sustained antitrust injuries. The Court held that a direct pur-
chaser could sue for the full amount of the overcharge it had paid,
whether or not passing-on had occurred.2 74 The result was a boon to
the deterrent function of treble damage actions where only the direct
purchaser sues, but it raised serious risks of duplicative recoveries
where both direct and indirect purchasers sue. Although the Court's
subsequent decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois275 was a self-con-
scious attempt to be consistent with Hanover Shoe,276 the holding
seemed to swing the pendulum in the opposite direction: by barring
all indirect purchasers from suing for passed-on overcharges and per-
mitting the direct purchaser to sue for the entire overcharge, the Court
sacrificed compensation and, arguably, deterrence2 77 at the altar of the
countervailing policies.
272. The circumstances that give rise to windfall recoveries and those that give rise
to duplicative recoveries are identical, with one exception. If only one purchaser, having
passed-on at least part of the overcharge it has paid, successfully sues for treble damages
on the entire overcharge, it will enjoy a windfall. Congress has given implicit approval
for windfall recoveries in this context, concluding that disgorgement of illegal gains
serves a deterrence purpose even if allocation of the recovery to the victims is im-
practical. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 165, at 13-17. Furthermore, among direct pur-
chasers this nonduplicative windfall is likely to be a commonplace in the wake of Illinois
Brick. See note 277 infra. The discussion below disregards this exception, and subsumes
windfall recoveries under duplicative recoveries.
273. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
274. Id. at 494. The Court noted that a pass-on defense might be permitted if the
suing "overcharged buyer [had] a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract" with the next pur-
chaser in the chain, and thus passed-on the complete overcharge. Id.
275. 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
276. See id. at 4614-15.
277. See note 222 supra. The Illinois Brick Court suggested that if direct purchasers
had to share the aggregate recovery for an illegal overcharge with the indirect purchasers
to which the overcharge had been passed-on, the direct purchasers would have so little
incentive to litigate their own claims that they would decide not to sue. 45 U.S.L.W. at
4617-18. The Court therefore barred indirect purchasers from suit in order to give direct
purchasers the maximum incentive to litigate their own claims.
The Court's behavioral assuipption about direct purchasers is questionable. A party
normally is motivated to recover his own damages even without the treble damage
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The nascent controversy over the Illinois Brick decision signals the
need for a reconsideration of the law of standing in chain-of-distribu-
tion cases. A fresh analysis can best proceed if the veneer of the
Hanover Shoe doctrine and its Illinois Brick extension is stripped
away, so that the class of cases can be examined without judicially
imposed barriers to defensive and offensive pass-on claims. The policy
analysis that follows explores the chain-of-distribution cases with an
eye to reconciling genuinely conflicting policies on a case-by-case basis
rather than rejecting one or another policy absolutely.
For a policy analysis that seeks to balance the risk of duplicative
recoveries against the deterrence of antitrust violations and the com-
pensation of overcharge victims, chain-of-distribution cases pose three
basic difficulties: the risk of inconsistent judgments in suits by
different levels, the complexity of litigation involving large numbers
of potential plaintiffs, and the complexity of proof of passing-on. The
three difficulties are closely related. The problems of complexity, both
as to numbers and as to proof, are mainly engendered by attempts to
mitigate the risk of duplicative recoveries from inconsistent judgments.
The basic strategy for adjusting the conflicting policies implicated
by chain-of-distribution suits is twofold. The first tack is to identify
instances of false conflict by recognizing that in a given case the po-
tential for inconsistent judgments may not exist because suits by non-
suing levels of purchasers are legally barred or are practically in-
feasible.278 The second tack, taken when simultaneous suits raise a real
potential for inconsistent judgments, is to minimize the risk of dupli-
cative recoveries by consolidating the claims of litigating plaintiffs
before a single trier of fact.2 79 This facilitates both the determination
and the apportionment of damages, so that no wrongdoer pays more
than once for the harm he has caused and no victim is overcom-
pensated.
Where all direct and indirect purchasers sue together, no exotic
incentive. Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955). The inducement is amplified by the treble damage
award, which was described by the Court earlier this year as designed to counterbalance
"'the difficulty of maintaining . . . private suit[s].'" Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690, 696 n.10 (1977) (quoting Senator Sherman's remarks about the
original treble damage provision in the Sherman Act).
278. For example, if a level in the chain of distribution consists of many purchasers,
it may not be feasible to bring a class action in its behalf. See Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
(massive class action by investors unmanageable because of size).
279. This strategy parallels the procedure contemplated and endorsed by Congress
when it enacted the parens patriae class action provisions of the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act. See HousE REPORT, supra note 165, at 13-17.
873
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 809, 1977
procedural techniques need be employed. If the suits are not brought
jointly or are not filed in the same district, then consolidation pur-
suant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure280 or in-
terdistrict transfer pursuant to the statutory provisions on venue281
and multidistrict litigation 2 2 can serve to bring all plaintiffs, regard-
less of their level in the chain, into the same action. Once this is done,
duplicative recoveries can occur only if juries bring in awards to dif-
ferent levels of purchasers that are inconsistent. This possibility can
be handled through various modes of judicial supervision such as jury
instructions or, if necessary, remittitur.2 3 Thus, when all levels in the
chain bring suit, mitigation of duplicative recovery risks is straight-
forward, and standing should be granted to all.
Where not all the potential plaintiffs sue, the possibility of subse-
quent suits by plaintiffs waiting in the wings presents a more serious
risk of duplicative recoveries. This risk rarely warrants denial of
280. "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions [and] it may order all the actions consolidated .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
Defendants may prefer to avoid consolidation of suits by different levels of purchasers
in order to advance a pass-on defense against direct purchasers and a no-pass-on defense
against indirect ones. Although Rule 42(b) grants trial courts broad discretion to separate
cases to avoid "prejudice," antitrust violators should not be permitted separate trials in
order to assert inconsistent pass-on defenses and thereby possibly avoid any liability
despite proof of an illegal overcharge. Rather, in consolidated proceedings a defendant
should be able to assert passing-on or absorption of overcharges by direct purchasers in
accordance with its evidence and trial strategy.
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) (court may transfer civil action to any other district
where it might have been brought "in the interest of justice" and for convenience of
parties).
282. See id. § 1407, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West Supp. 1977) (judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation may transfer cases for coordinated pre-trial proceedings to
promote "just and efficient conduct of such actions"). Following transfer for coordinated
pre-trial proceedings under § 1407, id., the transferee court may order a change of venue
for the transferred actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) so as to retain jurisdiction
over all of them for trial purposes. See In re Aircrash near Duarte, Cal., 357 F. Supp.
1013, 1015-16 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (citing cases).
283. Where a jury verdict is wholly unsupported by the evidence introduced, the
defendants would be entitled to a new trial. See Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 50S F.2d
167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975) (new trial may be granted where verdict inconsistent on its face
or jury "obviously confused"). In lieu of a new trial, the plaintiffs may consent to a
remittitur of excess damages, in an amount computed by the court. See, e.g., Treadway
Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316, 324-26 (D.N.J. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct.
690 (1977).
Notably, even if the Hanover Shoe doctrine were applied to bar the defense of
passing-on where all purchasers sue, the problem of inconsistent judgments would be
avoidable. Defendants would not be prejudiced by lack of a pass-on defense against the
direct purchasers because the indirect purchasers' proof of passing-on, which is essential
to their claims of injury, effectively would extinguish duplicative liability to the direct
purchasers.
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standing, however. The risk of duplicative recoveries in the context
of chains of distribution is no greater than the ordinary risk of
inconsistent judgments concerning conflicting claims to a common
fund.284 If antitrust victims were denied standing whenever there was
a mere prospect of excessive recoveries against violators, the deter-
rent and compensatory purposes of § 4 would be thwarted, and anti-
trust violators would escape liability altogether whenever one level
did not sue. Furthermore, the drastic step of outright dismissal of some
or all claims may be wholly unnecessary in the context of typical
chain-of-distribution cases.
A more tempered judicial response to the risk of subsequent dupli-
cative recoveries would be to ascertain, as an initial matter, how great
the risk actually is. In some cases the statute of limitations may have
run by the time of the standing determination, thereby precluding
further suits. 2sa Where the statute has not run, there may still be no
risk of duplicative recoveries. Should other purchasers file timely suits,
the court can exercise its authority to consolidate these suits with the
action before it at any time prior to final judgment.2 6 Only rarely
should this procedure prove impossible, for the lengthy duration of
antitrust suits makes it highly unlikely that a suit on the same cause
of action could be brought after entry of final judgment in an earlier
suit and before the statute of limitations bars the action.
Even if a defendant remains concerned by the slight possibility of
subsequent inconsistent judgments or settlements, denial of standing
should be a last resort. A number of procedural techniques can be
employed by defendants to reduce the risk of duplicative recoveries
still further. Pre-trial joinder of all levels of suing and non-suing pur-
chasers pursuant to Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) 28 7 is not necessary. Pursuant to
Rules 19(b) and 62(h) a court can stay execution of judgment in the
interest of avoiding duplicative judgments until the statute of limita-
284. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
108-09 (1968) (potential conflicting claims against insurance fund did not justify dismissal
under Rule 19(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
285. The statute of limitations for § 4 actions is generally four years from the time
the cause of action arises, except that private suits based on government actions may
be brought within one year of the termination of those actions. See note 237 sutpra. Other
antitrust commentators, though noting that antitrust claims may be filed shortly before
the statute of limitations runs, have acknowledged that the temporal bar can solve
problems of subsequent inconsistent judgments. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and
the Consumner Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 86
YALE L.J. 626, 650-51 (1976).
286. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (quoted note 280 supra).
287. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii) (joinder required if disposition in absence of party
would "leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incuning
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest").
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tions has run.288 Alternatively, a defendant seriously concerned can
await the outcome of the action before the court and then, if ad-
judged liable, can interplead any non-suing parties that are not yet
barred by the statute of limitations.28 9
The Illinois Brick Court suggested that statutory interpleader might
effectively be unavailable in many cases because "a condition prece-
dent for invoking statutory interpleader is the posting of a bond for
the amount in dispute. '290 This requirement, however, is not the in-
surmountable obstacle portrayed by the Court. First, the amount of
the bond need not be equal to the defendant's treble damage liability;
a bond for an amount deemed "proper" by the court is sufficient.29'
Second, when interpleader is postponed until all appeals are exhausted,
the bond would be no greater than the amount that the defendant
would otherwise have to pay the plaintiffs. 292 Thus, in those few cases
that reach judgment before the bar of the statute of limitations, statu-
tory interpleader seems to provide a workable means of minimizing
the risk of duplicative recoveries.2 98
To the extent that consolidation of plaintiffs' claims resolves the
problem of inconsistent judgments leading to multiple liability, it
raises another issue on which the Illinois Brick Court expressed con-
siderable concern: the complexity of the multiparty litigation that
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(h) (court may stay enforcement of final judgment). See Provi-
dent Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 115 (1968) (payment of
judgment can be withheld pending further suits).
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a), (b) (1970). For a discussion of statutory interpleader as
an alternative to Rule 19(b) dismissal, see 7 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 215,
§ 1608, at 74-75 (1972).
290. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4616 n.20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970)).
291. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970).
292. Two additional points about the interpleader procedure are worth noting in
the context of duplicative recoveries. First, the interpleader statute allays defendants'
fears of lack of personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs by providing for nationwide
service of process. See id. § 2361. Second, the interpleader procedure can solve the prob-
lem of inconsistent judgments even under the Hanover Shoe doctrine. In the absence of
pass-on defenses, the direct purchaser is more likely to recover supra-compensatory sums,
and therefore there is a greater risk that subsequent suits brought by indirect purchasers
will result in an excessive aggregate recovery. But this higher risk is different only in
degree, not in kind, from the ordinary risk of inconsistent judgments. Thus it too can be
mitigated by the interpleader procedure, which brings for resolution before a single court
the conflicting claims of direct and indirect purchasers. See note 283 supra.
293. Ironically, consolidation alone would have sufficed to mitigate duplicative re-
coveries in the Illinois Brick case, for both direct and indirect purchasers had sued at
the same time in the same district. See 45 U.S.L.W. at 4613. Although the direct pur-
chasers bad settled with the defendants, id. at 4613 n.5, the resulting risk of duplicative
recovery in the indirect purchaser suit did not warrant barring the latter. If a defendant
could ensure dismissal of subsequent § 4 suits by early settlement of one, it would
settle with the level of purchasers suffering the least damages, thereby frustrating the
compensatory and deterrent purposes of § 4.
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might ensue if indirect purchasers were permitted to sue.294 A policy
analysis recognizes this concern, but it also suggests that barring suits
by indirect purchasers as a way of reducing the complexity is a cure
more debilitating than the disease. A case-by-case evaluation is essen-
tial; dismissal of a plaintiff's claim due to potential complexity of the
action is rarely necessary. In some cases, there may be only a few
potential plaintiffs, because of the operation of the statute of limita-
tions, the small number of levels involved in the distribution network,
or the small number of purchasers in each level. Or there may be
only a few plaintiffs at trial, because the defendant is awaiting a
finding of liability before interpleading other prospective claimants.
In other cases, where many parties have sued, the complexity of the
litigation may be mitigated by various procedural devices or by the
particular circumstances of the case. For example, adjudication of
claims by consumers in chains of distribution can be expected to be
far simpler than before, because the Antitrust Improvements Act
provides for representation of consumer interests in parens patriae
suits brought by state attorneys general. 295 Thus, in most cases con-
solidation of plaintiff claims should not engender such unmitigable
complexity as to warrant dismissal of suits.
Once the conflicting claims of litigating plaintiffs have been con-
solidated, it is necessary to apportion damages fairly among them.
Since the apportionment should depend on which levels in the chain
of distribution suffered the most injury, proof that one or another
level passed-on its overcharges is critical. The Illinois Brick Court
stressed the difficulties of proving passing-on, given the theoretical
assumptions and empirical demonstrations that must generally be
made.290 The difficulties are real, but they should not be overesti-
mated. As the Court noted, percentage mark-up pricing, which facili-
tates computation of passing-on, is prevalent in "many sectors of the
American economy."'297 In cases arising from transactions involving
this form of pricing, proof of passing-on involves simply the computa-
tion of the elevation in prices caused by one level's application of a
percentage mark-up to the increased costs stemming from the prior
level's overcharge. 293 Percentage mark-up pricing thus makes it pos-
294. Id. at 4615-16.
295. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
296. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4616-17.
297. Id. at 4617.
298. Although determinations of volume reductions due to price increases are also
necessary to compute intermediate purchaser profit losses, such determinations have
been carried out by courts in the past. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271
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sible to compute passed-on damages where an indirect purchaser buys
a good untransformed by an intermediate purchaser or even, as in
Illinois Brick itself, where an indirect purchaser buys a finished prod-
uct with a component whose price includes a passed-on overcharge.2 99
Of course, not every case may involve percentage mark-up pricing,
and the problems of proof may consequently be more difficult. In
each case, however, the court should inquire into those problems to
determine whether proof of passing-on is truly infeasible.300 Only then
does the conflict between the positive and countervailing policies
in chain-of-distribution cases become irreconcilable. Under such cir-
cumstances it may be appropriate to permit only the direct purchasers
or only the indirect purchasers to sue, to dismiss the other plaintiffs,
and to preclude a pass-on defense in order to ensure that the deterrent
purpose of § 4 is not undermined.
The decision on how to deal with those chain-of-distribution suits
that create genuine, unmitigable policy conflicts should perhaps be
left to the legislative rather than the judicial branch. The decision
should depend on Congress's assessment of the compensation needed
and deterrence achieved by direct and indirect purchasers in general,
which in turn depends on the extent of passing-on in the economy. The
crucial point from a policy perspective is that chain-of-distribution
cases do not invariably present genuine, unmitigable policy conflicts;
on a case-by-case basis, there is much that courts can do, short of
denying standing to entire classes of antitrust victims, to resolve the
problems identified by the Illinois Brick Court. Neither worst-case
analyses nor generalizations about intractability serve the purposes
of § 4.
C. Ripple Effect Cases
The "ripples" generated by an antitrust violation, or a complex of
antitrust violations, may be transmitted via economic transactions to
F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1960). Furthermore, as the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Illinois Brick, no volume reduction effects need be
taken into account in computing end-purchaser damages. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4617 n.27.
299. The Illinois Brick Court failed to realize that the pass-on case before it pre-
sented relatively tractable matters of proof. Plaintiffs had purchased buildings through a
bidding process that itemized the costs to them and their construction contractors of an
illegally overpriced component of the purchased final product. See Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. V.
Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977). Accordingly, it was only necessary to
determine the extent of passing-on of the defendants' overcharges by wholesalers who
had sold the defendants' product to the building contractors. In those instances where
the building contractors purchased directly from the defendants, see id., no pass-on
computation was apparently necessary.
300. For other means of computing passing-on, see note 238 supra.
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a variety of parties beyond the market in which the violation has its
initial impact. The injuries thus sustained by parties outside the anti-
trust violator's chain of distribution give rise to an important class of
antitrust cases. Ripple effect plaintiffs may be businesses whose sales
to other businesses are diminished as a result of a defendant's restraints
on the activity of those businesses. 301 Or they may be purchasers from
defendant's non-conspiring competitors, sellers that have been able to
charge a higher price as a result of the defendant's violation. 02 These
kinds of factual patterns create a number of commonly misunderstood
standing issues.
Under a direct injury regime, many plaintiffs injured by ripple
effects would be considered "incidentally injured" and therefore
denied standing. The proposed analytical framework suggests, how-
ever, that such plaintiffs should not be denied standing as a matter of
course, because the countervailing policies may well be inapplicable
or mitigable. The pass-on questions characteristic of chain-of-distribu-
tion cases are not present in ripple effect suits because the latter in-
volve injuries to parties not related to one another through a single
chain of distribution. Therefore, ripple effect suits do not threaten
duplicative or windfall recoveries for injury not in fact suffered.
Furthermore, ripple effect suits raise only the possibility, not the in-
evitability, of overkill recoveries. Parties who are most immediately
affected by an antitrust violation may well not sue because of their
stake in an ongoing commercial relationship with the violator. The
aggregate claims of other parties actually suing or likely to sue may
not be so large as to have anticompetitive impact if recovered. Unless
the policy against overkill recoveries is actually implicated, standing is
as appropriate for ripple effect plaintiffs as for "directly" injured
plaintiffs: ripple effect plaintiffs are no less appropriate beneficiaries
of the compensation policy than those injured by a less circuitous
route. The compensatory purpose of § 4 is especially important where
ripple effect victims have been weakened as competitors in their own
markets.
A typical example of a ripple effect case is Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co. 30 3 The Billy Baxter plaintiff, a soft-drink franchisor,
was allegedly injured through loss of royalties and syrup sales, because
the bottlers it franchised and supplied (which were also franchised and
301. See, e.g., Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679
(8th Cir. 1966).
302. See, e.g., Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (D.C. 9th
Cir. 1968), noted, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1374 (1969).
303. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
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supplied by defendants) were foreclosed from selling the Billy Baxter
label by the defendant franchisors' predatory activities. 304 If the Billy
Baxter court's characterization of the plaintiff as a non-competitor of
the defendants305 is accepted, then the injury it suffered was a ripple
effect injury-an injury in the form of lost sales to the parties, its
franchisees, that were "directly" affected by the antitrust violation.
Although the Billy Baxter court denied standing on the ground that
Billy Baxter was not an "appropriate plaintiff, '30 6 a policy analysis
would have led to the opposite result.
The assumedly illegal destruction of the competing line of bottled
and canned soft drinks diminished demand for Billy Baxter syrups.
This diminution in demand in the soft drink syrup market was the
type of artificial restriction on competitive markets that the antitrust
laws are designed to prohibit. Therefore, Billy Baxter was within
the scope of the substantive protection of the antitrust laws. Since
Billy Baxter was clearly injured, indeed, driven out of business, the
compensation policy was triggered. At the same time, no counter-
vailing policy was implicated. Although consumers as well as plain-
tiff's franchisees had been injured, no potentially duplicative or
ruinously large suits by consumers had been or were likely ever to be
filed. N6 consumer could sue successfully because he would not be
able to prove anything other than nominal damages from the un-
availability of Billy Baxter's product. Similarly, the plaintiff's fran-
chisees, since they were bottlers for the defendants as well as the
plaintiff,30 7 were unlikely to sue lest they jeopardize an ongoing com-
mercial relationship with the defendants. Under these circumstances,
there could be no overkill recovery. Since the plaintiff's injuries cer-
tainly warranted compensation if its allegations were true,308 it should
have had standing under an analysis of the relevant policy considera-
tions. The possible restoration of a competitor in the soft drink syrup
industry would have been an additional policy reason for standing in
this case.309
304. Id. at 185-86.
305. Id. at 188-89; cf. id. at 194-95 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (contending that alleged
conspiracy was designed to eliminate plaintiff's brand-name products as competitors of
defendants' brand-name products).
306. Id. at 189.
307. Id. at 194-95 (Waterman, J., dissenting).
308. See id.; cf. Handler, supra note 110, at 26 ("difficult to understand why, as a
matter of antitrust policy, the franchisor [Billy Baxter] should not be permitted to sue").
309. Another important form of ripple effect injury is that suffered by lessors whose
lessees suffer antitrust injuries. Standing to sue for such an injury traditionally has
depended on whether the lessee participated in the illegal antitrust activity. Compare
Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (lessee allegedly co-
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D. Merger Cases
The chief policy issue in § 4 suits brought to recover damages from
mergers is typically not standing, but the existence of a cognizable
injury under § 7 of the Clayton Act, which is usually invoked when a
merger is potentially, rather than presently, anticompetitive.310 None-
theless, in merger suits by certain plaintiffs, courts have perceived
standing problems that prove illusory when scrutinized in a policy
analysis.
A typical merger may cause injuries associated with multiple effects
(e.g., monopolistic production cutbacks causing both higher prices and
refusal to deal with certain suppliers), chains of distribution (e.g.,
where merger defendants sell through distributors rather than directly
to consumers), and ripple effects (e.g., where an acquiring company
refuses to deal with its acquired company's customer, causing him to
pay higher prices elsewhere 311). Whether one, some, or all of these
types of injury are present, the policy-based inquiry remains exactly the
same: If there is a possibility of duplicative recovery, can it be avoided
at trial? If there is a possibility of overkill, is it of anticompetitive
proportions (particularly against a merger-strengthened competitor)?
Finally, does the compensation policy outweigh applicable counter-
vailing policies because of a need to protect competition in a plaintiff's
industry? Even where injury appears on its face to be entirely prospec-
tive, a policy approach would not rule out a damage action. The court
should consider whether an injunctive remedy would provide com-
plete relief from the alleged injury to competition and should gen-
erally afford the plaintiff an opportunity to prove present damages.
The application of the proposed framework to merger cases may be
illustrated by suits brought by customers and former employees of a
newly merged firm. Where employees sue for lost salary after a post-
conspirator; lessor has standing) with Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972)
(lessee not alleged to be co-conspirator; lessor lacks standing). In contrast, a policy
analysis would recognize that the lessor's interest in compensation for antitrust losses
is the same regardless of whether there is an intervening non-defendant. Cf. Wash-
ington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (D.C. 9th Cir. 1968) (identity of
party as defendant or intermediary "irrelevant" where plaintiffs' purchase price "af-
fected by elimination of competition"). Lessors' antitrust suits should be blocked on
standing grounds only if one of the countervailing policies is applicable.
310. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See Areeda, supra note 3, at 1128-30. A private antitrust
plaintiff must allege that he is presently being injured by an illegal merger. See Gottes-
man v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911
(1971); Areeda, supra note 3, at 1130 n.20.
311. See, e.g., Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (N.D. 111. 1964) (merged
company allegedly breached franchise agreement because franchisee refused exclusive
dealing arrangement).
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merger layoff, there is usually no question of ruinous recovery because
provable damages are limited312 and because the merged defendant's
financial strength is presumably enhanced. Furthermore, the duplica-
tion and windfall policies are not usually implicated unless separate
purchaser suits by persons in the chain of distribution also challenge
the merger. In such circumstances, the chain-of-distribution policy
analysis is apposite. Finally, where suits are brought by every victim
of the merger, including foreclosed or overcharged customers of a
merged defendant, the standing question is whether the ripple, con-
sumer, and supplier plaintiffs have claimed such substantial overall
damages that there is an unmitigable risk of overkill. In the absence
of such risk, employees and customers should have standing to seek
compensation for their injuries. Ordinarily, then, the real questions in
a § 4 merger suit should be factual and substantive legal ones: Was
the merger rather than, say, business fluctuations, the actual cause of
the layoffs or customer foreclosures?313 Was the merger actually a
violation if economies of scale were the demonstrable reason for the
layoffs?314 These questions are not, of course, appropriate for the
standing inquiry; usually they can be answered only after trial.
Conclusion
Courts and commentators agree that the literal language of § 4 of
the Clayton Act should not define the scope of the private treble
damage remedy in every case; it should be qualified by an additional
requirement concerning a private litigant's standing to sue. Yet exist-
ing approaches to antitrust standing are notably unsatisfactory. The
direct injury rule and its attendant tests are presently employed in a
virtual analytical void and have proven to be incapable of yielding
312. Most employees suffer only limited injury because they can find employment
elsewhere.
313. Where damages are only partially caused by an event not part of the antitrust
violation, "damages for the antitrust wrong will be accordingly diminished." See Mulvey v.
Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971) (two legal causes of injury). In Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727,
731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973), the court erroneously held that em-
ployees laid off after a merger could not, as a matter of law, show that their firing was
due to the merger, reasoning that layoffs would occur whether the merger was legal or
illegal. The court ignored the right of action accruing for layoffs caused by those
mergers that are illegal. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 690,
698 n.15 (1977) (dictum) (plaintiff could challenge anticompetitive aspect of merger).
314. It is not dear under current law whether economies of scale are a justification
for otherwise anticompetitive mergers. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
344 (1962); Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE LJ. 974, 975-76, 986 (1977).
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consistent results. The current law even reflects a basic uncertainty as
to the purpose of a standing doctrine.
The judicial concern that- § 4 not become a vehicle for unreason-
able damage awards can provide a rational basis for limiting the
scope of § 4 only if considered in tandem with the important com-
pensatory and deterrent purposes of the private action and in light of
the circumstances of each particular case. Only an analytical frame-
work focusing on policies provides a systematic way to analyze stand-
ing problems in the typically complex factual contexts of antitrust
cases. A policy approach would determine in a given case whether there
is a genuine policy conflict and, if there is, whether that conflict is
mitigable through traditionally available procedures, thus making
resort to standing denials unnecessary. In so doing, the proposed ap-
proach would not only enable courts and potential litigants-for the
first time-to analyze standing issues with reason and reliability. It
would also offer the hope of reconciling, at long last, the congressional
commitment that inspired § 4 and the judicial concern that has
restricted it.
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